Europe is in an intellectual mess over several features of its energy
and climate policies. This extends to a serious lack of comprehension of some
of the most fundamental aspects of electricity economics. Enthusiasts for competition and free market approaches
to the power sector have a preference for what are called “energy only markets”.
Unfortunately, and increasingly, these do not work. They do not act as a signal
for sufficient investment, or, with non-fossil technologies, even as a useful
signal to promote efficient operations. So nation states are increasingly
turning to measures such as capacity markets to ensure secure supplies for
their citizens. But the realities of national decision making on what is
acceptable security further undermine the basis for an overly restrictive competition
theorists’ concept of a single European market in electricity.
The European Commission on 13
April 2016 adopted
an interim report of a sector inquiry into capacity mechanisms. Commissioner
Margrethe Vestager, in charge of competition policy, said that: "European
consumers and companies should not have to face black-outs, and capacity
mechanisms can help to reduce this risk. At the same time, consumers should not
overpay for electricity and competition should not be undermined. The report
published today shows that there is a lot of room for Member States to improve
how they assess whether capacity mechanisms are needed, and how they design
them. Mechanisms that are open to electricity providers across EU borders are
key to building a true Energy Union in Europe."
In other words, energy-only
markets are not working. If they were,
why would the market not ensure, as it does in most sectors of the economy, adequate
supplies of what people need, when they need it?
Why energy only markets do not
work.
A peculiarity of conventional wholesale
electricity markets is that they are driven by the short run marginal (fuel and
operating) costs of the marginal plant needed at any point in time, normally
referred to as SRMC. But if prices are based on SRMC they cannot in normal
circumstances provide an adequate reward that covers the full costs, including
capital costs, of the capacity required for a secure system. This phenomenon has
long been recognised as a fundamental feature of electricity economics.
This anomalous feature of the
market can sometimes be masked during periods of technical change and strong
fuel price differentials, of which one example was the period of very cheap gas
combined with the growth of new combined cycle gas plant (CCGT). In these
periods prices continue to be set by increasingly marginal high fuel cost
generators, and new low fuel cost plant can earn large profits. But such periods are exceptional.
What we are now seeing with
the growth of renewables is an accentuation of this fundamental weakness in energy-only
wholesale market mechanisms. With renewables, fuel costs are zero and as the
share of renewables increases, joining other low carbon plant such as nuclear
that also has a very low SRMC, the power system as a whole becomes increasingly
subject to a zero wholesale price. Unsurprisingly this has led to fears of a
capacity shortage and real threats to supply security.
Energy-only markets of this
kind do of course have some advantages.
They are easy to grasp intellectually and they lend themselves naturally
to a comparatively easy translation across borders. It is therefore not
surprising that they should have been grasped with such enthusiasm by
proponents of competition and the internal market, an enthusiasm captured tellingly
in the above quote from the Commissioner. The increasingly evident distance
from economic and financial realities is unfortunate.
Capacity markets are yet another
remedy that constitutes a central intervention.
One market solution is to
allow higher prices that reflect scarcity, and to choke off consumer demand
rather than just depending on a SRMC mechanism.
This reliance on price spikes immediately hits political and regulatory
problems, those implicit in the Commissioner’s statement that consumers “should
not overpay”. An alternative was the UK approach adopted in 1990. The UK
electricity market reforms, the model on which much of subsequent EU endeavour
has been based, recognised the problem in the design of the new market
structure. The new market rules set
a penalty charge for failure to supply, constructed around a notional value of
lost load (VOLL).
This was intended as a minimal intervention, and to mimic how a market
might operate under conditions of capacity shortage, with the level of VOLL as the
critical parameter in setting the security standard expected by consumers. It
was a clever administrative device but suffered some of the same drawbacks as
reliance on scarcity pricing. It was not well understood and provoked regulatory
and political concerns, as well as accusations of market manipulation. At its
best it remained an administrative intervention, supplementing a “pure” energy
only market. However it demonstrated another important point very clearly, the
fact that the issue of determining how much capacity the system should have is
inextricably linked with the standard of generation security that is required. In
other words it is a regulatory or political decision.
The market issue for capacity
mechanisms is that they require some central authority, regulator or
government, to conduct the auction, to decide how much capacity is needed, when
and where it should be, how bids are to be compared and evaluated, how delivery is to be
monitored, and also of course how the new capacity is going to be remunerated. In other words it draws the government into the role of a central purchaser
and coordinator, acting over and above whatever else may be going on in the energy-only
market.
Now is not the point to
comment on the pros and cons of such a development. Clearly such interventions can be done
competently or incompetently. The point at issue for the competition authority
is that it is national governments that set the national standards of security
with which they are comfortable. But, in
the context of an EU internal energy market based on energy-only principles, any decision
on security and capacity by any one member state necessarily impacts on every other
national market in the EU. Some of these impacts may be trivial, but if a country like
Germany (say), close to the centre of gravity of Europe, opts to increase its
security standard, it induces additional capacity. This will automatically tend
to undermine the energy-only prices on which generators in other countries
across the EU are relying.
To take this point to its
logical conclusion, the competition and state intervention issues with which the Commission is wrestling
cannot be resolved without a single central EU authority determining a common
security standard across the EU. This is not going to happen any time soon. Moreover the capacity issue is far from being the only aspect of low carbon imperatives that will challenge the competition authorities.