Showing posts with label Power sector. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Power sector. Show all posts

Sunday, September 24, 2023

ROYAL SOCIETY REPORT HIGHLIGHTS LARGE SCALE ENERGY STORAGE AS A KEY ISSUE

I was recently asked, as one of the major contributors, to comment on the recent Royal Society report on large scale energy storage. This had been a major exercise, impressively managed and directed by the lead author Chris Llewelyn Smith, involving the examination of how a UK system based on weather dependent renewables might measure up against the actual weather variations observed over 37 years of weather data. My contribution was confined to general observations on how power systems work, and in particular how operational and investment choices can or should be managed in a market economy.

 

This was the subject of a previous post, but readers are recommended to refer not to my earlier comments but to the report itself and to the policy briefing. Links are given at the foot of this post.

 

The results were interesting and to some extent surprising. The work indicates a very large scale of storage requirement, driven primarily not by seasonal but by inter-annual variations – runs of years when wind may be below average, and a host of other interesting findings and questions. I was asked just to comment on what I saw as the core economic and financial implications regarding large scale storage.

 

Economics in his context is clearly about securing the right combinations of generation and storage, the principles to guide our decisions, and the mechanics of getting where we want to be. The objective is to find market or other mechanisms for the outcomes we want, ie getting to low or zero carbon at an affordable cost compatible with an acceptable level of reliability and energy security. It follows that this has to be much more than just a theoretical optimisation, but has to cover national policies, institutions, coordination, markets, regulation and infrastructure?

 

There are several particularly important general lessons from the report that have general economic and policy implications:

 

1.     First is the potentially huge scale of storage. With both scale and major economies of scale, we have typical infrastructure characteristics, that need to be financed as cheaply as possible. 

 

2.     Second, interactions between storage and generation choices and multiple other factors: including the demand side. The report illustrates just how complex this is.

 

3.     Third, conversion capacity, for moving energy in and out of storage, will matter and has perhaps hitherto been largely overlooked. 

 

4.     Fourth is the whole issue of policy and planning for reliability of supply. Traditionally this was mostly about adequate margins of generation capacity required over peak demands – so-called needle peaks. But the new world demands a quite different understanding of reliability, when we are talking about, for example, wind drought. The issue then is of kWh energy rather than kW capacity – a major distinction.

 

So the report raises some very serious questions. We can treat each of the above in turn.

 

First, it is clear that the storage need has all the characteristics that we associate with large scale infrastructure. This includes possible or probable incidence of natural monopoly, certainly substantial investment costs, long lived assets that are highly use specific, and a financial necessity for a cost of capital as low as possible. For private capital that would mean a high level of reassurance over future revenue streams and the future market and regulatory environment.

 

Second is the issue of the very complex choices, and their coordination, in systems that rely on storage. It’s important to recognise that there are two distinct timescales here. One is operational - operating the system as efficiently and economically as possible with whatever is the current mix of assets. The second is about necessary investment -  creating the best mix of assets for the future. In a perfect market efficient solutions on both timescales might be expected to result from market prices.  But in the new low carbon world that looks increasingly like a pipe dream.

 

The conventional view of power sector markets was that the price signals  in a competitive market derived from the immediate needs for the efficient operation of mainly generation assets, replicating what might happen in a fully optimised system such as the merit order. It also had to provide an incentive for adequate capacity.  Various extra mechanisms have often been added that attempt to put a valuation on reliable supply; this is sometimes referred to as value of lost load or VOLL.  In principle it was hoped that all this collectively would  incentivise the right mix of assets, generation, networks and storage for efficient and affordable future systems. In practice the most that can be said is that experience has been mixed.

 

So what is new. Traditional spot markets were developed to deal with gas and coal powered generators, and to replicate a merit order based on SRMC. They were also largely designed by the employees of those generators They do not translate or adapt easily to low carbon technologies with more complex, probabilistic, intermittency and operating constraints. Storage adds new dimensions, by being intrinsically multi-period, requiring in addition that attention is paid to conversion capacities, and the very different nature of the reliability issue.

 

The simple metrics of short run cost that sit behind conventional market mechanisms do not capture the information or the complexity required. Investment choices, on the four-way balances between generation, transmission, storage, and conversion capacity, pose further questions, implying a need for coordination. Discussion at the Royal Society brought out some additional questions on the subject of conversion capacities, my third point.

 

My fourth point may well be the most important public policy question for the future – the security and reliability of electricity supply. We all know that governments cannot stand aside from issues of energy security, and electricity security in particular, however much they might wish to. However this is another dimension where the economic and policy calculus has to change radically, with some very different metrics.

 

Historically supply reliability in the UK has been about generating capacity – kW, and occasional insufficiency of kW to meet needle peaks. But future crises, if they relate to sustained weather related shortages, will be about kWh rather than kW.  Threats of months of energy rationing require an entirely different way of thinking about reliability. Possibly once in a generation events, like the 1970s 3-day week, a covid crisis or curtailed gas supplies, may mean looking at not just energy supply planning but also the overall energy resilience of the economy. 

 

Answering all these questions means great attention to the institutional and market structures of the sector. We have to decide who should own and operate large scale storage, on public or private ownership, integration with grid operation, guarantees for private capital, who should make the decisions on energy security and reliability, and so on.  

 

All these issues are closely inter-related, and the report offers an indication of where we might find the answers. These must rest on some combination of the following:

 

·      Novel market mechanisms and incentives to reward provision of storage capacity and conversion capacity.

 

·      elements of long-term contractual assurance for infrastructure providers eg a regulated asset base approach, or government guarantees.

 

·      Centrally driven coordination of investment plans. Quite common internationally (eg France’s EDF and Germany’s Energiewende).

 

 

·      Enhanced role for the National Grid 

 

·      The creation of a ‘central buyer’, to procure capacity, but also to buy power from generators and sell to retail suppliers and large consumers.

 

·      Close cooperation between energy companies who implicitly assume collective responsibility for reliability  (the US ‘power pool’ model) 

 

In summary the economics for me is about:

 

·      balancing the roles of markets, thus retaining a role for competition, and central coordination

·      financing storage as essential infrastructure, and 

·      re-evaluating the policy approach to planning for reliable future systems

 

Possibly the most important observation of all, though, is that all these things take time and the task is urgent. That means starting to address these issues now.

 

 

Large-scale electricity storage report

https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/large-scale-electricity-storage/Large-scale-electricity-storage-report.pdf

 

Large-scale electricity storage policy briefing

https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/large-scale-electricity-storage/Large-scale-electricity-storage-policy-briefing.pdf

Sunday, November 20, 2022

HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE RISE OF STATE COORDINATION AND THE DECLINE OF RELIANCE ON MARKETS


A long term theme in this blog has been the exploration of markets and governance in the power sector. For most of the last 30 years the dominant paradigm, largely controlling public debate, has been an idealised model of competitive markets, private ownership, and the complete absence of any form of state planning. The UK was for a long time seen as the exemplar, the model that Brussels encouraged other EU countries to pursue, and a model that was promoted by the World Bank in its work in developing economies.

 

The reality has been somewhat different. In practice many EU countries, most notably France, were extremely reluctant to follow the UK model. The World Bank has become much more sceptical of the value of its privatisation mantra. There have been catastrophic failures in some of the exemplars of this neoliberal model, such as ERCOT in Texas. In the UK, although lip service has continued to be paid to the market ideal, the pendulum has swung back to more and more emphasis on state coordination and almost every aspect of investment decision taking in generation has been heavily influenced by government, whether through guaranteed feed-in tariffs or underwriting of long term contracts.

 

There are many reasons for this gradual reversion to a historical norm, in which the sector is dominated by vertically integrated and regulated monopolies, public or private, and requiring careful coordination. These include:

·      the imperatives for a low carbon economy, and the absence of adequate market signals to drive that

·      the fact that low carbon generation is not really compatible with the kind of market rules that were appropriate to fossil generation 

·      the close coordination required in low carbon systems to ensure both a balanced mix of investment and efficient and reliable operation

·      conventional financing issues around infrastructure and long-lived assets

·      perceived failures of reliance purely on markets to deliver acceptable outcomes

 

The result, however, has been the rise of state coordination and the decline of reliance on markets. This theme is explored in a recent piece by myself and Jose Maria Valenzuela, which, for the next 50 days or so, can be reached via the link below.

 

Jose has injected a social science perspective, and we combined partly as a result of our mutual collaboration in the Oxford Martin School Integrate programme. An interesting reminder for economists was the observation that monetarism persisted for so long because early failures were interpreted as success. Similar factors were evident in the energy sector.

 

https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1g6Qe7tZ6ZxRYB

 

Energy Research & Social Science. December 2022, 

 

Sunday, December 12, 2021

DECENTRALISED POWER GENERATION. DOES IT INCLUDE A FUTURE FOR COMBINED HEAT POWER? AND WHERE DOES THE BALANCE LIE?

 

Decentralisation is one of the three D’s for the future of low carbon energy sectors. It sits with decarbonisation as another factor driving smaller scale renewables generation, and digitisation, potentially enabling more localised control. But how much does the future lie with smaller local systems? Will a centralised National Grid remain at the core of the power sector? And will there be a resurrection of the prospects for localised combined heat and power schemes?

One organisation pushing a decentralisation agenda is the Association for Decentralised Energy (ADE). However their recent report makes some extravagant and misleading claims about the waste of energy in the “centralised” and “legacy” power systems that the UK currently enjoys. The report implies easy routes to eliminating waste, implicitly through combined heat power (CHP) schemes.

“Inherited from the public system of the 1960s and 70s, less than 10% of UK power stations currently recover waste heat, and this represents a missed opportunity to save £2 billion annually.”

The apparently obligatory deference to supposed virtues of the UK privatised power model, and the assumed culpability of a distant public sector past, are contradicted by historical fact. Almost all current power generation, both in renewables and combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT), is from plant built after 1990, within a supposedly “market driven” privatised power sector. About 2.1 % of November 2021 generation was from the nationalised industry “legacy” of coal, and none is baseload.

Wastage and CHP

ADE adopt the rather tired and misleading argument that electricity generation from fossil fuel “wastes” heat energy, and that combined heat power, essentially a decentralised operation, could therefore provide a substantial contribution to a low carbon economy, with considerable cost saving and efficiency gain.

This subject requires some understanding of the thermodynamic principles of energy and entropy. Not all energy is "useful" in the thermodynamic sense of its availability to perform real work (or even to heat homes effectively). “Waste” is an emotive and misleading way to describe the truth that conversion from “low grade” energy (eg coal) to something useful, like electricity, consumes energy en route. An internal combustion (ICE) vehicle may “waste” 75 % of the fuel in the tank but no-one imagines this waste heat is easily captured by the driver for useful purposes[1]. (Switching to electric vehicles offers three times the notional efficiency at point of use, but will of course incur upstream heat loss if from thermal generation.)

Combined heat power (CHP) schemes aim to make use of the heat content lost in fossil fuel generation to improve the overall efficiency, either through use of high temperature heat in industrial processes or lower temperature heat for buildings in winter. This is a laudable aim but it has an increasingly limited economic or carbon reduction potential for several reasons.

First, a much more compelling case for CHP was made, but without much success, in the 1970s, when the best fossil generation had thermal efficiencies in the 35-40 % range, and domestic gas boilers were about 60 % efficient. CHP offered theoretical overall efficiencies of 80 % (before distribution). The 1990s development of combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generation, with best in class efficiencies of around 65 % in baseload operation, and domestic condensing boilers with 90 % efficiencies, eliminated most of the theoretical cost and energy savings from CHP.

Second, efficiency claims for CHP systems were, even then, frequently overstated. Heat is lower-quality energy than electricity, and only at high temperatures does it become close to comparable utility. The number of such high temperature applications is limited, largely to industrial process heat, and was not helped by UK de-industrialisation. The more modest efficiency gains with low-temperature waste heat use, with potentially wider application to residential heating, carry heavy retro-fitting costs, and don't necessarily lead to substantial improvement in overall energy use, due to lower thermodynamic efficiencies, particularly if heat network and distribution losses are taken into account.

Third, and most crucially, a zero carbon economy requires rapid elimination of virtually all fossil fuel use, starting with its use in power generation. Renewables such as wind and solar, at whatever technical efficiency, do not in any case generate “waste heat”. There may be a plausible future role for heat networks fed by smaller scale modular nuclear reactors, but otherwise the potential for fossil-based CHP schemes seems to be confined to a very few niche applications.

“The UK could save the equivalent of £23 per household just by upgrading our electricity network's efficiency to match that of Germany's.”

International comparisons are often dangerous guides to reality. Losses in developed economies are a function of geography and economic structure as much as efficient network management. A casual inspection of energy statistics indicates that in Germany industrial consumption is nearly double that of domestic, while in the UK the reverse is true and domestic use exceeds industrial, reflecting the demise of much of UK heavy industry under the Thatcher governments of the 1980s and 1990s. Since heavy industry is almost invariably connected at much higher voltages, and much larger percentage losses occur in medium and low voltage distribution networks, Germany’s lower figure tells us little.

A good case can be made for additional capacity investment to reduce UK network losses, and even more so to support the stronger networks needed to cope with the big increase in electricity’s role in a low carbon economy. Some of the network companies regularly make that case, but of course investment has to be paid for, and loss reduction does not therefore automatically lead to lower consumer bills.

Centralising or decentralising factors in a low carbon economy.

The future balance between decentralisation and centralisation requires a much more nuanced analysis. It will of course be geography specific, but we can note a number of factors, in the UK at least, tending towards centralisation and a strong transmission grid:

·         A high proportion of currently projected low carbon sources of power are either intrinsically large scale, like conventional nuclear, may depend on a substantial network infrastructure, like carbon capture, or are remote from consumer load, with long transmission lines, and require central coordination to exploit weather diversity, like offshore wind.

·         Inflexibilities or variabilities in output – for nuclear or renewables – mean that larger interconnected, and inevitably to some degree centralised, systems enjoy major advantages in reducing the cost of reliable supply. Small systems, perhaps with a single source of renewable energy, need interconnection. And the UK system benefits from international interconnection.

·         The importance and relevance of energy storage for power systems can accentuate the above.

On the other hand, there are forces for decentralisation.

·         There is demonstrably an essential need for much more consumer involvement in the operation of power systems. Low carbon generation gives rise to much more complex needs, including the management of overall demand with more sophisticated tariffs having a major role. 

·         There is a plausible role for heat networks, as one alternative to heat pumps, of which CHP associated with modular nuclear is one possibility. These may be the more suitable option in some urban environments. They require substantial investment in retro-fitting and communal maintenance and strong local governance structures such as local heat authorities.

·         Changing patterns of electricity generation and use may create new and localised problems in the management of lower voltage networks, so that more control, management and governance systems are required at lower voltage levels, but without reducing the importance of the high voltage transmission grid.

…………………………………………….

Some of these issues can be explored in much more detail elsewhere.

The future of low carbon networks. Heat networks. Enabling Efficient Networks For Low Carbon Futures | The ETI

The future of consumer and network tariffs in a low carbon economy. How must energy pricing evolve in a low-carbon… | Oxford Martin School

 



[1] though the internal heater may recover a small fraction of that in winter