HITACHI PROPOSES NATIONALISATION OF NUCLEAR. HAS PRIVATISATION PROVED COMPATIBLE WITH LOW CARBON POLICIES?

Hitachi unwillingness to proceed with the Wylfa project represents not only a crisis for the future of large scale nuclear projects in the UK, but also casts doubt on the competence of our governments to implement low carbon policies, or for the country to secure the investments it needs within the current market and ownership arrangements. It follows on from cancellation of support for carbon capture, after the private sector had sunk hundreds of millions of investment, and more recently for the renewable tidal lagoon programme. For this and other reasons it is time to question many of the basic policy and economic assumptions that underpin the current organisation and governance of the sector. 

"Time for a realistic appraisal of our liberalised market experiment.  Is this the end of the road for the wilder free market fantasies of the 1990s?"

……...

We are in the UK currently witnessing a number of testaments to the failings of structures set up in the 1990s, and after, as an important and widely acclaimed part of the Thatcherite revolution to reduce the role of the state and re-invigorate the disciplines of the marketplace. This has been most evident in the spheres where permanent contact, and conflict, between public policy and private incentives is almost unavoidable. For the UK the most salient current examples are probably:

·         Transport, where public dissatisfaction with prices and service quality on the railways is reaching new heights, and, some allege, the level of subsidy exceeds that given to the pre-privatisation network.

·         Health, where the notorious Lansley reforms have proved to be either useless or counter-productive in making the NHS “internal market” more effective.

·         Electricity, where Hitachi’s effective withdrawal from UK nuclear power construction threatens a fundamental plank of the UK’s energy policy.

·         Oil, where the failure of the private sector to make adequate provision for North Sea decommissioning places a potential bill on taxpayers estimated at £24 billion, a number not much smaller than the £39 billion the UK will be paying as it leaves the EU (and the latter number is much less likely to escalate).

This is a big subject, so today’s comment is confined to the power industry and a little bit of its history.  We do of course need to recognise that electricity privatisation did indeed achieve some important gains. Most notably the move away from self to independent regulation and into private ownership created the financial incentives for efficiency in electricity distribution, where costs fell substantially. It’s also true that the previous governance structure of the industry was far from perfect. As a 1980s Chief Economist at the somewhat dysfunctional Electricity Council, then tasked with the sector’s regulation, I observed that the old CEGB had a degree of professional arrogance, a tendency to goldplating investment and poor investment decisions, and also disregard for the interests of consumers and the downstream distribution sector. It was in some ways far too independent of political control. On the positive side, it was always highly professional and inter alia contributed substantially to UK science research efforts in ways that have since been badly missed.

The structure set up at privatisation, to which I also contributed, was also a success, at least in the short term. Its most remarkable achievement, however, was to replicate the reliable, efficient and internationally admired operation of the National Grid. This was to change from a centralised command and control of plant dispatch in ascending order of cost, the so-called merit order, with a market system that could, as a matter of both principle and practice, deliver the same performance from the existing collection of power stations. The seamless transfer from public to private, and from command and control to a free market and private ownership, was achieved without the misfortunes that were to dog the privatised rail network a few years later, where the network management in essence “lost control of the assets”, inter alia leading to some tragic accidents.

But if operational efficiency was maintained, and distribution costs reduced, successful transition to dependence on private sector investment was much less clear. The market arrangements were designed to allow the threat of power shortages to induce price rises that would incentivise enough capacity through very large “price spikes”.  Together with initial animal spirits and the coincidence of radical technology change (combined cycle gas) with cheap gas, along with guaranteed markets for some of the investors, this all worked for a while, but it was not long before the cracks started to appear. Government and the then regulator refused to accept the logic that deficient supply could in principle drive higher prices and that these would be essential, in the absence of any other commitments to investors, to get new capacity built. The original market mechanism designed to act as a signal for new capacity was abandoned with the new trading arrangements in 2000. Since then there has been no substantial new investment in generation that has not relied either on long term contractual guarantees, as with the nuclear programme, or on similar levels of guarantee through feed-in tariffs.

The government has in practice been wholly unable to escape responsibility for sector investment. As the Hitachi episode, among others, shows, this has brought its energy policy, and the pretence of relying on private sector finance, close to collapse. However that pretence has brought its own costs. Complex financial structures, as with private finance initiative (PFI) projects, have been successful mainly in raising the cost of capital, as compared to keeping projects on the government books.

These are far from being the only problems with the new market structures that have been allowed to evolve since 1990 and 2000. Others include the continuing EU wide absence of carbon prices necessary to promote low carbon policies, failure of the sector structure to promote rational tariffs either now or for the future, inappropriate loading of social and other costs into consumer prices, and widespread dissatisfaction with energy supplier profit margins.[1] All of these subjects are extremely important and deserving of more analysis.[2]

Nor is there any evidence, on the basis of international price comparison[3], that the UK, or at least its consumers, have benefited from the path breaking reforms of the Thatcher era. The table below compares UK and French domestic electricity prices over the last three years. The relative position of the UK benefits significantly from the exchange rate decline after the 2016 referendum. France, a near neighbour and similarly sized economy, is chosen as an interesting comparator because it has had a much more centrally controlled system, and, unlike the UK, has benefited from a successful nuclear programme.

The comparison of prices to large industrial consumer prices, which are a closer measure of generation costs, show a similar picture.

This shows the small but significant improvement in the UK’s position attributable to the post referendum fall in the exchange rate. But the larger gap, as compared to households, also suggests that UK “competitive failure” has been manifested mainly in power generation.

All of the above leads to the suggestion that all is not well with energy sector governance in the UK. Widely acclaimed as leading the world in the 1990s, the reality has been that the UK’s liberalised market frameworks have simply not delivered within a 21^st century environment. Surely this is the time for a comprehensive re-appraisal.

---

[1] A number of these tariff issues are discussed much more fully in the author’s paper prepared for Energy Systems Catapult, and published by them as

Cost Reflective Pricing in Energy Networks.  The nature of future tariffs, and implications for households and their technology choices. April 2018.

[2] A much fuller discussion of these points is also given on another page on this site, Low Carbon Power, and also the author’s “think piece”, published in 2016 by the Energy Technologies Institute on how to deliver efficient networks for a low carbon future energy system. It aims inert alia to set an agenda for a future power systems architecture.

Enabling Efficient Networks  for Low Carbon Futures: Options for governance and regulation. 2016

[3] Price comparison data is taken from sources published by BEIS and is readily available online.

BREXIT, HITACHI AND CLIMATE CHANGE. SERIOUS LESSONS TO BE LEARNED.

Michael Mackenzie wrote in yesterday’s FT (18 January) that Brexit was weighing heavily on on investment confidence in the UK.

“… one opinion has held sway among professional custodians of money for some time: steer clear of the UK.” Investors are increasingly wary of investing money in the UK economy, partly because of the dangers associated with a disorderly exit from the EU, partly because a UK not in the EU is a far less attractive proposition, and partly because of continuing chaos and uncertainty in government.

This is clearly one of the factors behind Hitachi’s decision to pause construction on the Wylfa nuclear power station in Anglesey. But another is the sheer difficulty and complexity of putting together private sector financing for massive energy projects. “Foreign companies are increasingly leery of British infrastructure projects”, according to Nick Butler, also writing in the FT. And this problem transcends Brexit, although it is certainly amplified by it.

According to FT reports (17 January) “People involved in the Wylfa project said a lack of firm financing commitments made it impossible for Hitachi to keep pumping in its own cash.” Hitachi intimated that their involvement could only continue if the project were kept off their balance sheet, limited further investment was required and there was a prospect of adequate profit. FT reporting commented that “… to meet these criteria is likely to require a significant change in the UK government’s approach to financing nuclear power.”

This is a huge blow to the government’s plans for early decarbonisation of the power sector, and hence for its contribution to internationally agreed targets for combatting climate change. It is widely argued that the costs of other renewable sources such as solar energy or offshore wind are falling sufficiently rapidly that this should not be a concern, and that these technologies are already more than competitive with nuclear power.

However, the government has also effectively killed off the Swansea Bay tidal lagoon project, a renewables energy project with the potential to overcome some of the objections to wind and solar power, that it was insufficiently predictable to provide a complete answer to the issue of supply security and reliability. Once again there is a strong suspicion that the government was unwilling to support financing arrangements that would have given this project a sufficiently low cost of capital to make it viable.

In spite of nuclear travails, it remains difficult to envisage a low carbon future without some elements of nuclear power.  “It’s difficult to see a low-carbon energy system in the future which has no new nuclear,” says George Day, the head of policy and regulation at the government-funded Energy Systems Catapult.[1]  Moreover the government has previously killed off prospects for early adoption of carbon capture and storage (CCS), another prime candidate for non-intermittent baseload power generation.

In my view there are a number of clear lessons to be learned from this debacle.

First, it is clear that almost any form of long life generation investment in the power sector represents infrastructure that will only be created when investors have a very clear policy and regulatory commitment from government. In many instances, as with the feed-in tariffs to support renewables, this will often amount to essentially a long term government guarantee. The arguments are explored more fully on another page on this site, but it is currently very difficult to point to any form of generation investment that is not supported either by long term tariff arrangements or explicit guarantees.

Second, there is clear evidence that the government’s insistence on private sector finance, and keeping the government’s involvement “off the books”, runs the danger of raising the cost of capital and also of performance failure. The Hitachi debacle may be another illustration of the weaknesses and very high capital costs exposed both in the private finance initiative and the blunders associated with the public private partnership for upgrading the London underground [2]. The risks include an impact both on cost – these are all extremely capital intensive projects, and hence on affordability. But, if not delivered, they also imperil the other energy trilemma objectives of security and sustainability.

Third, from a public policy perspective, we are reminded once again that projects that may well be essential to address fundamental concerns such as greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and climate change, will almost always appear as “uneconomic” when there is no means for them to capture the value of full human cost of greenhouse gas emissions. Current carbon prices are nowhere near the level required, either to match the future damage those emissions will cause, or the likely cost of capturing carbon from the atmosphere, something that will almost certainly be required to meet temperature targets such as 1.5^o C. Contrary to some conventional assumptions, an even higher value attaches to reducing current CO2 emissions compared to those in twenty years time. (Again this issue is explored in more detail on another page.)

Fourth, it seems impossible to escape the pernicious consequences of the Brexit traincrash, even though the energy sector might be seen as one of the least affected, at least directly, by question marks over future trade with Europe.  

Fifth and finally, and this is a challenge for my own involvement in the Oxford Martin School programme concerned with renewables, we need to focus more attention on defining, and if possible increasing, the extent to which we can meet future requirements from a combination of intermittent or variable output sources combined with storage and the management of consumer loads. Not least this could help to mitigate the failure to bring forward either carbon capture or nuclear investment in sufficiently timely fashion.

---

[1]Energy Systems Catapult is part of a network of world-leading centres set up by the government to transform the UK’s capability for innovation in specific sectors and help drive future economic growth. Its aim is, by taking an independent, whole energy systems view, to work with stakeholders across the energy sector (consumers, industry, academia and government) to identify innovation priorities, gaps in the market and overcome barriers to accelerating the decarbonisation of the energy system at least cost.

Catapult modelling has tended to support both nuclear power, including smaller modular nuclear technology, and carbon capture.

[2] The Blunders of our Governments, Ivor Crewe and Anthony King. 2013. Its treatment of the London underground fiasco, and the very high cost of capital incurred, is particularly scathing.

HINKLEY POINT. A FURTHER RECOGNITION THAT INFRASTRUCTURE DECISIONS BELONG WITH GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENTS CAN NO MORE STAND BACK FROM SYSTEMIC FAILURES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR THAN THEY CAN IN MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCE.

Recognition of the limitations of the market in the energy sector is rapidly becoming universal. The Comment in today’s FT by Martin Wolf, possibly the most widely respected economic commentator in the UK, hammers this point home. The immediate focus of Wolf’s article is the Hinkley decision, but his arguments have a much wider resonance. For the energy sector, and the power sector in particular, the problems (and the market failures) run even deeper than those for infrastructure projects in other sectors. And governments can no more stand back from systemic failures in the energy sector than they can in money, banking and finance.

……….

“This decision had to be taken by government. No competitive market process would have reached such a decision or even been allowed to reach such a decision. ….  But if government or its agencies are to take such decisions, they must also take them well. …  Regulatory regimes must be designed to address the complex attributes of sectors with significant externalities. Decisions in such sectors are often very lumpy and politically difficult. They cannot — and will not — be left to decentralised market processes.” [Martin Wolf. FT. 16^th September 2016]

This is an excellent summary of what I have argued at greater length in the page on low carbon power. The essential feature of infrastructure, from the perspective of any private or institutional investor, is that the asset is immobile, has few or no alternative uses, and depends on revenue streams over a long period. Moreover infrastructure usually relates to essential services whose management and conduct is subject to various forms of policy and regulatory intervention. It is no accident that the historical development of public utilities has been strongly associated with regulated monopoly, which protects the utility as much as the consumer, with vertical integration, and with long term contracts and government guarantees. These all offer the investor some protection against political or regulatory opportunism, and the temptations to expropriate the investment once the costs have been sunk.

In addition the power sector has some particular market failures of its own. The case for and value of almost all low carbon investment stems from its contribution to reducing emissions and hence limiting the damage of climate change. In the continuing absence of effective and reliable means of pricing CO2 at levels consistent with the policy imperatives of mitigating climate change, there is no way that any private investor can capture this value from any of the existing market processes.

Supply security might in principle be susceptible to a “market” solution, but the NETA reforms in 2000 effectively removed the previous mechanisms that had been designed to incentivise new capacity. Energy only wholesale markets, essentially the lynchpin of current market structures, cannot reward capacity properly, and their weakness is reinforced by the increasing proportion of plant on the system at zero marginal cost. Capacity markets may be part of the solution, but these have to be implemented by some party, the government or its agent, who can specify how much is required and then monitor, control and pay for its delivery.

Existing markets were largely designed by and for fossil fuel fuel generators, the CEGB and its successor companies. They depend on the particular technical and economic features of fossil generation – flexibility, and fuel driven marginal costs – to replicate the merit order in a market driven optimisation of plant scheduling and dispatch. The conditions for this to work successfully cease to apply in situations with more complex technical constraints, such as plant inflexibilities (nuclear) and intermittency (solar or wind).

And of course there are also the many questions linked to the operation of complex transmission and distribution networks, to the influence of external sources such as interconnection, to the use of storage technologies and to the much closer engagement of consumers within future systems. We should also add the strong possibility that technical factors, especially around renewable technologies and storage, will lead to a power sector with much more decentralised operations and decision taking, alongside a continuing need for large scale transmission and interconnection.

Identifying the need for some central and strategic decision making is just the first step. Improving the quality of those decisions, and their execution, is vital. There is a strong case for an agency at arms length from government, and hence more removed from political pressures. It is also easier to build the essential technical and commercial expertise within such a body than within a government department.

The wisdom of the Hinkley decision itself is a more controversial question. Entities such as the Committee on Climate Change or the Energy Technologies Institute, charged with examining approaches the UK’s low carbon targets, tend to positions that assume significant components of nuclear or carbon capture.  There may have been serious questions for EdF around the choice of Hinkley technology, and for the UK government around the negotiation of the price, but, assuming delivery, there is no hard evidence that this is a bad deal. The frequent comparison with current wholesale prices is largely irrelevant since it is quite clear that these are unsustainable as the basis for rewarding investment in a future low carbon power system. The government process may not have been impressive, and it may be quite seriously sub-optimal, but it has at least now made a pressing decision, and we should hope that the Hinkley venture is as successful as the French nuclear programme of the 1980s.

The wider questions, looking beyond Hinkley, are around what institutional changes may be required, in order to exploit rapidly changing technology options, implement the policy imperatives of sustainability and security, and make effective use of markets. All this is calling for a new “system architecture”, a comprehensive re-think of the way the sector is regulated, new market designs, and how networks are managed at local, national and trans-national levels. Expect to hear a lot more about system architecture!

HINKLEY C. LINKS TO TRADE ISSUES OR A CHANGE IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY?

Normal service is resumed, as the author is again connected to this site after three weeks of very limited broadband access.

My last comment, on the subject of Hinkley C, failed to anticipate just how much the issue might be linked to broader diplomatic and trade issues. I focused on what I thought were the big technical and economic questions, and the position of EdF as one of the main contracting parties. Shortly afterwards, the UK announced that it would be reviewing the matter, and postponing its final decision to the autumn. It emerged that this was not because of doubts over the economic and strategic case, or concerns over the technology, but on broader grounds of national security.

Prima facie this episode represents a remarkable change in political philosophy. Under the prevailing globalisation and neo-liberal paradigms, and under Thatcher and subsequent governments, the UK has been remarkably relaxed about allowing foreign control not only of major British companies but also of key elements of infrastructure in the power sector, water, ports and airports. This has happened to a much greater degree than in other major economies such the US, France and Germany. But Chinese involvement in Hinkley seems to be the issue that is provoking a degree of doubt, and one of the concerns is national security. Or does this represent a high water mark for the philosophy of unfettered global markets?

A lot of features of the project remain unclear. If the Chinese involvement were purely a matter of debt finance, with EdF taking primary responsibility for construction, then it is hard to see why security should be a matter of major concern. However it has already been anticipated that the Chinese will play a much bigger role in subsequent development of the UK nuclear programme, at Bradwell, using Chinese technology, so we must assume that the Hinkley financing arrangements go beyond a simple matter of providing funds. No doubt all will be revealed when the final decision is announced.

Moreover, in the context of the referendum vote, and UK prospects for expanding its non-EU trade, the diplomatic significance of postponing the decision is also considerable. Government ministers are already wrestling with the problems of whether the EU exit vote implies leaving the customs union and the single market, and no clear position has emerged. In early July the UK also received a substantial rebuff from the US, with the US trade representative making it clear that trade discussions could not even begin until relations with the EU had been settled. There is no real reason that this, ie no discussion even in principle, should necessarily be the case. But it is a reminder that when US presidents offer formal diplomatic advice to an ally, they deserve to be taken seriously; this is something of an object lesson for the hapless ministers charged with steering a path to an EU exit that does not seriously damage the UK economy.   

Hinkley point has now caused a serious upset to the prospects for closer trading relationships with China. That is not to say that security concerns are unjustified, but just that trade relations are a complex matter, and may involve very serious compromises over sovereignty. The bottom line though is that in the space of a few short weeks, the UK has undermined its trade and business links with the three largest economies in the world, the US, EU and China.

Expect more trade related issues for the energy sector. One very substantial issue will be the UK’s continued membership of the EU emissions trading scheme. Prima facie this could sit outside the customs union and the internal market. Moreover trading emissions, in principle, and like other theoretical and practical benefits from trade, should allow UK emissions targets to be met at lower total cost. This has to be set against the deficiencies of the actual scheme that is in place. But this remains a large topic for the future, and one to which I suspect this author will return.
.......................................................

I have learned a great deal about the history of the UK nuclear programme, and some of the background to the Hinkley story, from listening to talks given by Simon Taylor of the Judge School at Cambridge. Simon has a blog at http://www.simontaylorsblog.com/

His new book on the subject is now available: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Fall-Rise-Nuclear-Power-Britain/dp/1906860319/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1456993863&sr=1-1

HINKLEY POINT. DILEMMAS FOR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND BRITAIN’S NUCLEAR SAGA CONTINUES.

Britain’s nuclear saga continues. The UK appears to be committing itself to a new generation of nuclear stations. It is making use of a French design and Chinese finance, and confidence ought to be inspired by the huge success of Electricite de France (EdF) in decarbonising the French power sector in the 1980s and 1990s, a generation ago. Public opposition to nuclear has declined with a growing awareness of its potential contribution to reducing CO2 emissions and mitigating climate change, and its importance is reinforced in the studies and reports coming from bodies such as the Committee on Climate Change and the Energy Technologies Institute. So what is going wrong? Why are there now doubts over EdF’s commitment to the project, its financial viability and the apparently very high cost of the Hinkley Point project to the UK consumer?

First, let us summarise some of the fundamentals.

Decarbonising the power sector remains a first priority in meeting UK climate policy and targets for reduction of greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide emissions. The importance of the emissions objective was underlined by the Paris agreement in December 2015, and despite the pre-eminent position of many climate sceptics in the Leave campaign, there is no sign of Theresa May’s new government reneging on those commitments. To do so would be wholly antithetical to the image of an outward looking Britain that the government is trying to restore.

The most influential energy projections point to a necessary and substantial role for nuclear in decarbonising the economy. These include those from the Committee on Climate Change and the Energy Technologies Institute. It needs to be said that they also generally assume development of carbon capture and storage (CCS). CCS funding was withdrawn as part of Osborne’s austerity programme in November 2015, to the distress of the energy industry and some justified outrage. If anything that merely increases the importance attaching to the nuclear contribution in future. Obviously future developments, eg in renewables, interconnection and storage, could in principle change these perceptions, but that is not yet a mainstream position.

The referendum vote changes nothing. It does not change commitment to carbon targets. Nor does it alter in any fundamental way the commercial interests of the UK and France, even though, along with our substantial reliance on interconnection, it emphasises the close interdependence of our economies. Each government has strong interests in advancing UK nuclear. In each case there may be significant elements of industrial strategy that sit behind official support for the project. France wants to maintain a leadership role in a strong European nuclear industry. The UK needs to rebuild some of its own credibility in the sector and will be hoping to provide at least part of the supply chain for any nuclear renaissance. It also needs the capacity to meet growing demand and its low carbon aspirations. If Hinkley makes sense and is “ready to go” then it is attractive. There are however big questions on whether the UK is paying a fair price, and whether the French have on this occasion chosen to back the right nuclear technology.

What is the EdF financial problem? In financial terms EdF can no longer be viewed as the unconstrained state monolith of yesteryear.  Its financial structure is such that, when viewed as a private company, it lacks the balance sheet strength to take on a major project and construction risk on this scale. However EdF remains 85% owned by the French government, and in spite of the noises that will be made about state aids, it is hard to see a project of this magnitude, and strategic and diplomatic significance, being scuppered by largely theoretical concerns about competition law. Whether the project continues to make technical and commercial sense is another matter.

And the technical problems? The French programme of the 1980s and 1990s was hugely successful, and arguably the outstanding example globally of a successful nuclear power programme. So the technical concerns over the Hinkley Point and Flamanville design might be a surprise. Why not replicate the earlier designs?  Unfortunately the world has moved on. With the hiatus over nuclear build in Europe, much of the previous experience has been lost and the key engineers retired. Changes in regulatory and safety requirements, possibly overdone, mean these are fundamentally new designs, not just modifications to tried and tested ones. Finally power stations such as Hinkley are not just pieces of nuclear technology. They are also huge engineering projects. Like many infrastructure projects, eg Channel Tunnel, they are intrinsically subject to the risk of big cost overruns. All parties, including the French and UK governments, should therefore be seeking the highest possible degree of reassurance that we can be confident the technical problems will be overcome.

A good deal for the UK? That is really a question about the price paid, and the details of the contract, including responsibility for unforeseen costs and liability for any failure to deliver on the promised outputs.  Comparison with current or recent wholesale prices is irrelevant, partly because they do not represent a sustainable long run price even for conventional power sources, and partly because the real question is about how to get to the least cost outcome for a low carbon system. Nevertheless there are strong suspicions that the UK may not have secured a good deal on Hinkley Point. If so this can be put down at least in part to a lack of negotiating and technical expertise in the old DECC, and possibly to ideological refusal to countenance direct UK government funding, which Nick Butler in the FT has estimated could have saved some 20% on the kWh price.

Alternatives for the UK if Hinkley Point flounders

Abandoning nuclear and reverting to new gas fired plant as a transitional measure looks an unattractive option in the context of low carbon targets, since these would risk early closure as emissions targets progressively tighten post Paris. Placing a heavier emphasis on carbon capture means reversing the foolish cancellation of funding in 2015, but this is almost certainly a necessary measure in any case, rather than a replacement for Hinkley.

Even if the decision is taken not to proceed with Hinkley, this is unlikely to be the end of the nuclear story in the UK. Further stations are anticipated, using Chinese technology and different designs. There is also increasing interest in smaller scale “modular” nuclear plant, which avoids many of the potential problems of large scale civil engineering, and relies on factory assembled parts where smaller scale and the benefits of replication can also reduce the risk of serious design flaws emerging at a late stage.

Whatever the outcome of tomorrow’s EdF Board meeting, we can expect to hear more about these issues in the months and years ahead. Doubts over the commercial choices and some of the decision making processes also lead neatly into some of the governance and “system architecture” issues that are gaining prominence and which will be addressed in this blog later this summer and during the autumn.
.....................
I have learned a great deal about the history of the UK nuclear programme, and some of the background to the Hinkley story, from listening to talks given by Simon Taylor of the Judge School at Cambridge. Simon has a blog at http://www.simontaylorsblog.com/His new book on the subject is now available: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Fall-Rise-Nuclear-Power-Britain/dp/1906860319/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1456993863&sr=1-1