Nothing better illustrates the
complex interdependencies in modern economies better than the cluster of interrelated
threats now hitting the UK with high gas prices, gas company failures, HGV
driver shortages and supply chain problems, and shortages of CO2 –
all interacting and impacting on food supplies, supermarket and fuel
deliveries, and retail price inflation. So looking for the OBE – One Big
Explanation – is a mistake. But the explanations, excuses and blame
shifting currently in evidence are interesting and various. As usual they will
include personal prejudices and ideologies as well as informed analysis. Here
are a few from the last few days, and an attempt to give a considered, but
still personal, verdict on each. The perspective is examination of UK response
to both global trends and UK circumstances.
In energy at least it’s just the
global gas market and supply shortage. There are multiple causes, and all we
can do is try to mitigate the impacts. This contains an essential
truth, with a well-established willingness to pay much higher prices (for LNG)
in Far East markets, together with more immediate and temporary factors such as
weather or low renewables output triggering dramatic spikes in gas prices. But
in spite of meeting up to 50% of demand from domestic production, UK prices remain
highly exposed to international markets and possibly have surged more than
elsewhere in Europe. Decisions to leave the EU's single market for energy, and
to make Britain more “independent”, plus reduced reliance on storage, are
additional factors that may be exacerbating the UK crisis. Verdict. Global
and more regional, European, factors and trends are real and substantial; but the
obvious criterion for judging UK government and institutions is UK performance
in comparison with other EU countries, most of which are significantly more
import dependent.
Covid? It is
hard to see why the fading impacts of the covid pandemic should be very
different in the UK from the impacts in other countries which have suffered
very similar levels of infection. Verdict. Covid will have affected
everything in the last 18 months, but as an all-purpose excuse, this is
starting to sound rather tired.
It’s all down to our obsession
with climate change, and trying to go green, at the expense of energy
security. So, if we had doubled down on our dependence on
gas, we would be better placed to manage a global tightening of gas supplies? Prima
facie, earlier moves to low carbon sources, renewables or nuclear, would have
reduced gas import dependency and mitigated the current crisis. One might also
more justifiably argue, in relation to the related CO2 shortage,
that Osborne’s highly controversial 2015 cancellation of carbon capture
projects (essential components of global low carbon climate strategies)
deprived us of an obvious alternative source of CO2.
This would at least have reduced the risk to food production that was an
indirect consequence of the gas price spike, and avoided the need for a
government subsidy to CO2 production. These potential supplies might
well have been in the wrong place or lacked delivery infrastructure, but this is
at least a logical response to a silly argument. Verdict: blaming Green
policies to reduce fossil dependency is both counter-intuitive and, in this
instance, simply wrong.
Turning to the transport
sector, other long term trends, including demographics and an ageing HGV
workforce, are to blame. Other countries face the same HGV problems. These
are exactly the trends markets are supposed to anticipate, manage and remedy,
eg via higher wages and industry training initiatives? The UK has been
particularly badly hit, largely due to the post-Brexit exodus of EU drivers. Verdict.
These are trends that should have been anticipated, so this is a partial
explanation or excuse at best. Comparison with other European countries, which do
not have empty shelves or petrol queues, is instructive.
Failures in the design and
regulation of UK energy markets. UK electricity trading
arrangements do not deal adequately with reliability. Consequently, in the
power sector, government has already assumed de facto responsibility for
capacity planning. But the current crisis is primarily in gas and
responsibilities for security are less clear than in other parts of the energy
sector. Traditionally, public utilities supplying essential services like gas
were regulated monopolies for a reason. Competition, the Tory and Thatcher
mantra for decades, should have been fine provided there was a means of
enforcing an obligation to supply on all market participants. Absent that,
together with a weak regulatory framework and no clear responsibility for
delivering reliability, and problems begin. There is every incentive for aggressively
competitive suppliers to undercut more prudent suppliers who have covered their
commitments to consumers by contracting for firm future supplies, sometimes at
a higher but guaranteed price. This can lead to gambling on permanent excess
capacity and the assumption that spot prices will always be low. Failure to
anticipate price spike risk puts some companies in trouble and leads to systemic
risk for the sector and government bailouts. Verdict. This is a
regulatory and policy failure by the UK government, over decades, but it is
also a major factor in the current crisis.
It’s Brexit, stupid! Brexit
adversely affects both transport and the energy sector. Undoubtedly
the loss of EU drivers is a major factor, probably the biggest, in reducing HGV
capacity. But Brexit has also made haulage less efficient. It limits the cabotage
rights which made UK (and EU) haulage more efficient. A truck from Spain
dropping fruit in Glasgow could pick up dairy in Glasgow for delivery in Hull,
then fish in Hull for delivery in Madrid. Ending cabotage is equivalent to
reducing effective HGV capacity.
Trade with Europe in both gas
and power remains important for our security. Brexit inevitably puts more
friction into that trade, though this may have so far had at most only a
limited impact on exchanges of power or on energy security. But it could become
a significant factor in a more serious energy crisis, just as in other supply
chains. Verdict. Brexit consequences, positive or negative, inevitably
impact on almost every aspect of the economy and this includes energy,
transport and trade.
It is the downside that is
currently in evidence, summed up in the following quote. “Energy price hikes,
empty shelves, chronic labour shortages, tax rises, rampant inflation and
that’s before we start talking about farming, fish or the motor industry. Where
is the Brexit Wonderland we were promised?”