A GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Antti Lipponen of the Finnish Meteorological Institute has created an animated chart that shows the trend in global and national temperatures from 1900 to 2017, ie almost to the present day. The distinctive feature is that it shows how an overall trend, significant in itself, can mask even more dramatic swings in individual geographies and in variations between them. Some though not all of these are likely to be experienced as episodes of unusual or extreme weather, eg drought or flood.

It is expressed in terms of temperature anomalies, or deviations from the norm. In this case this just means deviation from the average over the period 1951-1980.
To interpret what is happening in more detail, the following is a useful key
Year. In the centre of the circle is the year of the observations, starting in 1900.
Global temperature trend: top right of the picture.
Temperature anomalies.   Moving out from the centre are five concentric rings, corresponding to the size of the anomaly: from – 2.0^oC through –1.0^oC, 0.0^oC, +1.0^oC, to +2.0^oC. Individual country values are expresses as spokes emanating from the centre, with colours expressing the scale of the deviations, (negative = blue, positive = red)
Geography. The individual countries should be visible in full screen mode, but for a quick impression of what is happening in global differences, note that the quadrants can be summarised as follows. Moving clockwise from 12.00, we find:

Top right; Asia and the Middle East
Bottom right: Africa
Bottom left: Europe
Top left: The Americas and Oceania

The animation has the virtue of demonstrating in visual form the potential significance of global warming in provoking increasing numbers of extremes, which may nevertheless vary substantially from year to year, country to country, and continent to continent.

SERIOUS US RECOGNITION OF CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES NEED TO BE PUT ASIDE.

A more urgent approach to climate issues is stirring again among US politicians and opinion formers. A recent FT article highlights apparent conflicts of approach, and the need to reconcile them. In part any conflict might be seen as just another illustration of the deep ideological divide between believers in the ability of unfettered markets to resolve all problems, and proponents of a much greater role for state intervention. The reality is that effective policy on mitigation of climate change will always demand a combination of coordinated actions at government level with the powerful incentives that economic instruments can provide. There is no single silver bullet. Markets won't work on their own, and we also need both effective action on infrastructure and focused regulation.

Martin Wolf is always worth reading on economics and this remains true when he turns his attention to climate issues (The US debate on climate change is heating up. FT, 19 February 2019). This recent article suggests that informed opinion in the US, perhaps for the first time since the early days of the Obama administration, is moving towards increasing recognition of the fact that the US, widely seen as a laggard on climate related policies, cannot stand back from its global responsibilities in relation to curbing emissions. The US, as a country, still has the greatest historic responsibility for CO₂ (the most significant of the greenhouse gases), even though it has now been overtaken by China on current emissions. It is also still close to the highest for current per capita emissions, where it is matched  only by a few countries such as Australia (coal once again at the heart of the problem) and surpassed in the oil states of the Middle East by countries such as a Saudi Arabia with a notorious history of wasteful subsidies to energy consumption.

Data source: CDIAC (1751-2013) and BP (2014-2015)

Wolf highlights two recent announcements. The first is an “economists’ statement on carbon dividends”, endorsed by 3,333 US economists, including four former chairs of the Federal Reserve and 27 Nobel laureates. Its main elements are

·         a carbon tax starting at $40 a ton

·         combined with a “carbon dividend” approach to return the proceeds to US citizens

·         border tax adjustments for the carbon content of imports and exports

·         prices to act as a substitute for unnecessary regulations.

This plan is also to be proposed to "other leading greenhouse gas emitting countries".

Source: Union of Concerned Scientists

The ideas per se are not new. Most economists view emissions pricing as a necessary if not sufficient part of any solution. Others have discussed carbon wealth fund, and tax and dividend approaches. (The “Carbon wealth fund” tag links to three earlier articles.) Helm and Hepburn[1] were early proponents of border tax adjustments.  But bringing them together as a coherent package, and recognising the seriousness of the issue (where economists have often been slow), is very welcome.

The second announcement is the Green New Deal proposed by a group of House Democrats, led by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. It is a proposal to transform the US economy by moving to zero carbon sources for power generation and upgrading all buildings to achieve maximum energy efficiency. The approach is strong on regulatory intervention and infrastructure investment, but ignores the incentive effects of prices and markets. Activists vigorously oppose market-based mechanisms, emissions trading and offsets. With even more Utopian fervour they also dismiss major technology options such as carbon capture and storage, nuclear power, waste-to-energy and biomass energy, when the selection of at least some of these options is at least helpful, and very likely necessary for a low or zero carbon future.

Opposition to so many alternative technologies, and a refusal to countenance economic measures, sadly reduces the credibility of the Green New Deal. But we should be almost equally critical of any assumption that a pure market approach is capable of solving all our problems. (Indeed I suspect this is an assumption that may well not be shared by most of the 3,333 signatories). The criticisms are both theoretical and practical.
1.    The starting point of $40 per tonne is too low on its own to incentivise much or most of the investments and behavioural. Moreover, signalling a profile of carbon prices rising over time runs in the opposite direction to the environmental value of emissions reduction, which ought to prioritise current emissions[2].
2.    Inter alia a rising profile leads to the well-known Green Paradox[3], where fossil producers have an incentive to advance their production of the most polluting fuels.

3.    Border tax adjustments make a great deal of theoretical sense, but pose huge practical and administrative issues in measuring carbon content. Given the existing complexities of international trade, rules of origin, etc, and in the current global trade environment, they could quickly fall into a tangled web of complex negotiations and disputes.

4.    The major investors willing to fund big infrastructure projects at a low or modest cost of capital, eg pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, demand secure revenue streams that markets on their own will not provide. This necessarily implies either government guarantee in some form, or some equivalent in terms of monopoly status and mandated moves towards low carbon. (This argument is explored in more depth on another page on this site).

5.    Effective strategy is highly dependent on innovation, and the market failures related to innovation are well documented. Again this implies significant interventions as well as price signals that incentivise investment.

6.    There are numerous instances where regulation on its own can achieve significant gains. One of the most dramatic illustrations of this is the effect of the change in US road vehicle regulation, in the late 1980s, relaxing the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards for vehicle fuel efficiency. Technical progress in engine efficiency, implying a falling consumption per tonne, but without the CAFE targets the efficiency gain simply translated into heavier (ie more wasteful in energy terms) vehicles, and vehicle fuel efficiency improvement came to an end.

Trends in engine efficiency contrasted with trends in vehicle fuel economy, responding to relaxation of US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in late 1980s. Source; Lutsey and Sperling.

It is clear that the two competing different strands for realistic climate policy need to come together. At least there is a common objective. To quote Wolf: “Time is limited, talk plentiful and action negligible. But we can only start from agreement that there is indeed a threat worth addressing.” That at least now looks possible in the US. Let us hope it can be translated into more effective policies, and not just in the US.

The reality is that effective progress depends on a fusion of the two camps. The propositions are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing. Many of the “other leading greenhouse gas emitting countries”, to whom the proposals are to be put, have long recognised (as has the World Bank) that a trio of policy instruments is required. 

·         Markets and taxes are the instruments with which economists are most at home, framed to reflect the massive externalities of future environmental damage that are not captured without an intervention of the kind proposed by the US economists.

·         Innovation and  infrastructure, which for the most part are only partly and insufficiently incentivised by market signals, and usually depend heavily on additional intervention with some form of government support and (typically) financial or regulatory guarantees.

·         Regulations and standards which only governments can enforce, to support  policy objectives and promote behavioural change where that is part of the solution.  

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[1] Helm D, Hepburn C, Ruta G (2012) Trade, climate change, and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 28: 368-394.

[2] This is discussed at much greater length in the author’s earlier paper. Cumulative Carbon Emissions And Climate Change: Has The Economics Of Climate Policies Lost Contact With The Physics?, John Rhys, OIES Working Paper EV 57, July 2011.

[3] The “Green Paradox” is usually attributed to a controversial book by German economist, Hans-Werner Sinn, describing the observation that policies that becomes greener with the passage of time acts like an expressed intention to expropriate fossil resources for the owners, inducing them to accelerate extraction and hence to accentuate the problems.

CAN COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS GRASP THE CLIMATE CHANGE NETTLE?

And can we justify ambitious targets?

It is easy, for anyone concerned about the future of the planet and our place on it, to assume that formal economic analysis of the case for mitigating climate change is almost redundant or has only limited value in determining the course of action we should take. However, Simon Dietz’s strongly recommended presentation at the Oxford Martin School last week[1] was a timely reminder both that we cannot in practice escape responsibility for some balancing of costs and benefits, and that, in spite of the limitations, trying to answer that question can still yield valuable recommendations and insights.

Weaknesses in the economic calculus

The weaknesses of conventional applied economics, especially cost benefit analysis, in quantifying issues on the scale of climate change are widely recognised.

Some of the weaknesses are of a technical, conceptual or even philosophical nature. In dealing with risk and uncertainty, there is little or no empirical basis for assessing probability distributions. Non-linearities and non-market effects present technical challenges. The policy choices are a long way away from the world of marginal analysis in which cost benefit analysis (CBA) is typically more comfortable. Distributional and inter-generational inequalities bring in philosophical and ethical questions, and economics still lacks a philosophically sound and universally accepted basis for time discounting.

An even bigger issue perhaps has been the inability of conventional macro-economics to capture the complexities, or indeed the potential scale, of major disruptions caused by climate (or, arguably, other non-marginal or disruptive changes such as Brexit).  So-called integrated assessment models (IAMs) purport to capture complex feedbacks between climate impacts and economic output, but the judgment from academics on IAMs has been damning[2].  Such models come “close to assuming directly that the impacts and costs will be modest, and close to excluding the possibility of catastrophic outcomes”, according to Nicholas Stern^[3].  In other words, they largely assume away the problem they are supposed to be analysing. It is for these reasons that CBA arguments have become the new line of defence for climate sceptics whose refusal to accept the science has clearly become untenable.

In plain language, Robin Harding in the FT^[4] claimed that

… one standard model only gives damage greater than 50 per cent of output with 20^oC of warming. Combine that with the assumption that the economy will be many times bigger in the future and the problem is clear. Your grandchildren might be cooking in their own fat on the London Underground, but rather than regarding them as dead, these economic models would regard them as wealthier than you. …

… After the financial crisis, the world did not construct vastly complicated models to estimate the chances of another meltdown and the damage it would cause. Policy makers simply recognised that regulations such as the US Dodd-Frank Act are a small price to pay for preventing a repeat performance. It is time to take a similar risk-based approach to the greater problem of climate change.

But we still need to choose between 2 ^oC and 1.5 ^oC targets

Simon Dietz’s presentation focused very clearly on a current issue – the case for, and practicality of, adoption of the aspirational 1.5^oC target that arose from the COP 21 Paris Agreement. He pointed out, correctly, that the lower target would remove a very substantial part of the “remaining carbon budget”, and that this required unprecedented rates of reduction in carbon emissions, leading us inter alia to early “zero carbon” and the necessity of carbon capture. Other calculations implied a high implicit carbon price of $100 per tonne of CO₂, or more.

Defending cost benefit analysis, at least partly on the basis that alternatives faced, and similarly failed to resolve, most of the same difficult issues as CBA, he attempted to answer the 1.5^oC question. His analysis, which neatly side-stepped some of the methodological issues, ultimately boiled down to the biggest uncertainty of all – estimating the cost of the damage from climate change.

Successfully avoiding the CBA/ modelling trap described above, of assuming away the problem, he argued that the (wide) range of damage estimates made from an empirical rather than an IAM approach could at the very least make a strong case for the lower target, even if this was not conclusive in CBA terms.  Subsequent discussion focused on what was or was not included in the various estimates of the costs of climate change, notably in relation to resource conflicts and migration.

The conclusions may have seemed uncontroversial or even too mild to many in the audience, especially those of us with professional exposure to climate issues, but Simon noted that at least one distinguished economist had estimated 3.5^oC of warming, often taken to be catastrophic, as an “optimum” amount. Simon also emphasised the importance of the “options” argument[5] for adopting a lower target. More action now increases the room for manoeuvre as time passes, especially if more knowledge increases the estimated risk of “tipping points” or serious downside and catastrophic outcomes.

Reinforcing the case for early action and tighter targets

Related arguments have previously been advanced by the actuarial profession, who of course have long specialised in the analysis of catastrophic risk. In 2014 Oliver Bettis addressed an event at the Grantham Institute and argued [6]for a “risk of ruin”  approach similar to that used in the insurance industry. The conclusion of his analysis, and using “actuarial” risk parameters, was that:

  

·         the CO2 already released (400ppm) produces unacceptable risk of ruin

·         emergency decarbonisation may be the correct risk management response.

·         allowing for slow feedbacks, the right target might be below 350ppm

·         removal of CO2 from the atmosphere should be investigated.

In qualitative terms this could be seen as a similar set of conclusions to Simon’s, but with even more aggressive support for lower targets. Actuaries are possibly more risk averse than economists.

And assessing the practicality and cost

Perhaps the most important barriers to a lower target are simply those of practicality and cost. A badly managed and extremely disruptive re-engineering of the entire energy sector, and indeed the entire economy, could after all bring with it its own “risks of ruin”. It is often asserted that the costs of action are simply unaffordable.

However, at least in very broad macro-economic terms, the admittedly high costs of decarbonisation appear as eminently manageable when compared to other major disruptive impacts on the world economy. At a national level for example, if we take Simon’s very approximate estimate of $100 per tonne, and apply it to UK emissions of about 500 million tonnes of CO₂, we get a cost of c. 1.4% of GDP; this is consistent with the 1-2 % range common in post Stern discussions of the cost of action necessary to curtail emissions to a “safe” level. As often pointed out, this might mean reaching a particular standard of living less than12 months later by 2050.

While in most contexts 1-2 % of GDP is a substantial quantity, it is comparable to other energy and other commodity price shocks that the world economy has absorbed, mostly without ruinous dislocations. Notably these include the multiple oil price shocks of the last 45 years.  Compared to the impact of the 2008 financial crash and its consequences, estimated to have cut GDP by as much as 15%, or to current expectations of the possible near term cost to the UK of Brexit, the cost of climate action can be seen as modest and eminently affordable.

Intellectually therefore the case for ambitious climate action is strong. Less well developed are, first, the levels of political support and, second, agreement on, and acceptance of,  the actual means to get there. But that, as they say, is a series of stories for another day.

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[1] This can be viewed online and, together with the immediately previous presentation by Joeri Rogelj provides an excellent introduction to understanding the current state of play on carbon budgets and policy dilemmas.

[2] Pindyck, Robert S. 2013. "Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us?" Journal of Economic Literature, 51(3): 860-72. Pindyck is particularly scathing.

A plethora of integrated assessment models (IAMs) have been constructed and used to estimate the social cost of carbon (SCC) and evaluate alternative abatement policies. These models have crucial flaws that make them close to useless as tools for policy analysis: certain inputs (e.g., the discount rate) are arbitrary, but have huge effects on the SCC estimates the models produce; the models' descriptions of the impact of climate change are completely ad hoc, with no theoretical or empirical foundation; and the models can tell us nothing about the most important driver of the SCC, the possibility of a catastrophic climate outcome. IAM-based analyses of climate policy create a perception of knowledge and precision, but that perception is illusory and misleading.

[3] The Structure of Economic Modeling of the Potential Impacts of Climate change: Grafting Gross Underestimation of Risk onto Already Narrow Science Models / Nicholas Stern. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 51, N° 3, pp. 838-859, September 2013

[4] Robin Harding. 2014.  “A high price for ignoring the risks of catastrophe.”  Financial Times. 18 February 2014.

[5] The maintaining of options is also an important part of the case for attaching a higher value to saving current emissions, rather than assuming a rising real price of carbon, addressed by the author, inter alia in Cumulative Carbon Emissions and Climate Change. Has the Economics of Climate Policies Lost Contact with the Physics?  Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Working Paper.

[6] Risk Management and Climate Change: Risk of Ruin. Oliver Bettis. Event at Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment London, 14 January 2014.

HITACHI PROPOSES NATIONALISATION OF NUCLEAR. HAS PRIVATISATION PROVED COMPATIBLE WITH LOW CARBON POLICIES?

Hitachi unwillingness to proceed with the Wylfa project represents not only a crisis for the future of large scale nuclear projects in the UK, but also casts doubt on the competence of our governments to implement low carbon policies, or for the country to secure the investments it needs within the current market and ownership arrangements. It follows on from cancellation of support for carbon capture, after the private sector had sunk hundreds of millions of investment, and more recently for the renewable tidal lagoon programme. For this and other reasons it is time to question many of the basic policy and economic assumptions that underpin the current organisation and governance of the sector. 

"Time for a realistic appraisal of our liberalised market experiment.  Is this the end of the road for the wilder free market fantasies of the 1990s?"

……...

We are in the UK currently witnessing a number of testaments to the failings of structures set up in the 1990s, and after, as an important and widely acclaimed part of the Thatcherite revolution to reduce the role of the state and re-invigorate the disciplines of the marketplace. This has been most evident in the spheres where permanent contact, and conflict, between public policy and private incentives is almost unavoidable. For the UK the most salient current examples are probably:

·         Transport, where public dissatisfaction with prices and service quality on the railways is reaching new heights, and, some allege, the level of subsidy exceeds that given to the pre-privatisation network.

·         Health, where the notorious Lansley reforms have proved to be either useless or counter-productive in making the NHS “internal market” more effective.

·         Electricity, where Hitachi’s effective withdrawal from UK nuclear power construction threatens a fundamental plank of the UK’s energy policy.

·         Oil, where the failure of the private sector to make adequate provision for North Sea decommissioning places a potential bill on taxpayers estimated at £24 billion, a number not much smaller than the £39 billion the UK will be paying as it leaves the EU (and the latter number is much less likely to escalate).

This is a big subject, so today’s comment is confined to the power industry and a little bit of its history.  We do of course need to recognise that electricity privatisation did indeed achieve some important gains. Most notably the move away from self to independent regulation and into private ownership created the financial incentives for efficiency in electricity distribution, where costs fell substantially. It’s also true that the previous governance structure of the industry was far from perfect. As a 1980s Chief Economist at the somewhat dysfunctional Electricity Council, then tasked with the sector’s regulation, I observed that the old CEGB had a degree of professional arrogance, a tendency to goldplating investment and poor investment decisions, and also disregard for the interests of consumers and the downstream distribution sector. It was in some ways far too independent of political control. On the positive side, it was always highly professional and inter alia contributed substantially to UK science research efforts in ways that have since been badly missed.

The structure set up at privatisation, to which I also contributed, was also a success, at least in the short term. Its most remarkable achievement, however, was to replicate the reliable, efficient and internationally admired operation of the National Grid. This was to change from a centralised command and control of plant dispatch in ascending order of cost, the so-called merit order, with a market system that could, as a matter of both principle and practice, deliver the same performance from the existing collection of power stations. The seamless transfer from public to private, and from command and control to a free market and private ownership, was achieved without the misfortunes that were to dog the privatised rail network a few years later, where the network management in essence “lost control of the assets”, inter alia leading to some tragic accidents.

But if operational efficiency was maintained, and distribution costs reduced, successful transition to dependence on private sector investment was much less clear. The market arrangements were designed to allow the threat of power shortages to induce price rises that would incentivise enough capacity through very large “price spikes”.  Together with initial animal spirits and the coincidence of radical technology change (combined cycle gas) with cheap gas, along with guaranteed markets for some of the investors, this all worked for a while, but it was not long before the cracks started to appear. Government and the then regulator refused to accept the logic that deficient supply could in principle drive higher prices and that these would be essential, in the absence of any other commitments to investors, to get new capacity built. The original market mechanism designed to act as a signal for new capacity was abandoned with the new trading arrangements in 2000. Since then there has been no substantial new investment in generation that has not relied either on long term contractual guarantees, as with the nuclear programme, or on similar levels of guarantee through feed-in tariffs.

The government has in practice been wholly unable to escape responsibility for sector investment. As the Hitachi episode, among others, shows, this has brought its energy policy, and the pretence of relying on private sector finance, close to collapse. However that pretence has brought its own costs. Complex financial structures, as with private finance initiative (PFI) projects, have been successful mainly in raising the cost of capital, as compared to keeping projects on the government books.

These are far from being the only problems with the new market structures that have been allowed to evolve since 1990 and 2000. Others include the continuing EU wide absence of carbon prices necessary to promote low carbon policies, failure of the sector structure to promote rational tariffs either now or for the future, inappropriate loading of social and other costs into consumer prices, and widespread dissatisfaction with energy supplier profit margins.[1] All of these subjects are extremely important and deserving of more analysis.[2]

Nor is there any evidence, on the basis of international price comparison[3], that the UK, or at least its consumers, have benefited from the path breaking reforms of the Thatcher era. The table below compares UK and French domestic electricity prices over the last three years. The relative position of the UK benefits significantly from the exchange rate decline after the 2016 referendum. France, a near neighbour and similarly sized economy, is chosen as an interesting comparator because it has had a much more centrally controlled system, and, unlike the UK, has benefited from a successful nuclear programme.

The comparison of prices to large industrial consumer prices, which are a closer measure of generation costs, show a similar picture.

This shows the small but significant improvement in the UK’s position attributable to the post referendum fall in the exchange rate. But the larger gap, as compared to households, also suggests that UK “competitive failure” has been manifested mainly in power generation.

All of the above leads to the suggestion that all is not well with energy sector governance in the UK. Widely acclaimed as leading the world in the 1990s, the reality has been that the UK’s liberalised market frameworks have simply not delivered within a 21^st century environment. Surely this is the time for a comprehensive re-appraisal.

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[1] A number of these tariff issues are discussed much more fully in the author’s paper prepared for Energy Systems Catapult, and published by them as

Cost Reflective Pricing in Energy Networks.  The nature of future tariffs, and implications for households and their technology choices. April 2018.

[2] A much fuller discussion of these points is also given on another page on this site, Low Carbon Power, and also the author’s “think piece”, published in 2016 by the Energy Technologies Institute on how to deliver efficient networks for a low carbon future energy system. It aims inert alia to set an agenda for a future power systems architecture.

Enabling Efficient Networks  for Low Carbon Futures: Options for governance and regulation. 2016

[3] Price comparison data is taken from sources published by BEIS and is readily available online.

BREXIT, HITACHI AND CLIMATE CHANGE. SERIOUS LESSONS TO BE LEARNED.

Michael Mackenzie wrote in yesterday’s FT (18 January) that Brexit was weighing heavily on on investment confidence in the UK.

“… one opinion has held sway among professional custodians of money for some time: steer clear of the UK.” Investors are increasingly wary of investing money in the UK economy, partly because of the dangers associated with a disorderly exit from the EU, partly because a UK not in the EU is a far less attractive proposition, and partly because of continuing chaos and uncertainty in government.

This is clearly one of the factors behind Hitachi’s decision to pause construction on the Wylfa nuclear power station in Anglesey. But another is the sheer difficulty and complexity of putting together private sector financing for massive energy projects. “Foreign companies are increasingly leery of British infrastructure projects”, according to Nick Butler, also writing in the FT. And this problem transcends Brexit, although it is certainly amplified by it.

According to FT reports (17 January) “People involved in the Wylfa project said a lack of firm financing commitments made it impossible for Hitachi to keep pumping in its own cash.” Hitachi intimated that their involvement could only continue if the project were kept off their balance sheet, limited further investment was required and there was a prospect of adequate profit. FT reporting commented that “… to meet these criteria is likely to require a significant change in the UK government’s approach to financing nuclear power.”

This is a huge blow to the government’s plans for early decarbonisation of the power sector, and hence for its contribution to internationally agreed targets for combatting climate change. It is widely argued that the costs of other renewable sources such as solar energy or offshore wind are falling sufficiently rapidly that this should not be a concern, and that these technologies are already more than competitive with nuclear power.

However, the government has also effectively killed off the Swansea Bay tidal lagoon project, a renewables energy project with the potential to overcome some of the objections to wind and solar power, that it was insufficiently predictable to provide a complete answer to the issue of supply security and reliability. Once again there is a strong suspicion that the government was unwilling to support financing arrangements that would have given this project a sufficiently low cost of capital to make it viable.

In spite of nuclear travails, it remains difficult to envisage a low carbon future without some elements of nuclear power.  “It’s difficult to see a low-carbon energy system in the future which has no new nuclear,” says George Day, the head of policy and regulation at the government-funded Energy Systems Catapult.[1]  Moreover the government has previously killed off prospects for early adoption of carbon capture and storage (CCS), another prime candidate for non-intermittent baseload power generation.

In my view there are a number of clear lessons to be learned from this debacle.

First, it is clear that almost any form of long life generation investment in the power sector represents infrastructure that will only be created when investors have a very clear policy and regulatory commitment from government. In many instances, as with the feed-in tariffs to support renewables, this will often amount to essentially a long term government guarantee. The arguments are explored more fully on another page on this site, but it is currently very difficult to point to any form of generation investment that is not supported either by long term tariff arrangements or explicit guarantees.

Second, there is clear evidence that the government’s insistence on private sector finance, and keeping the government’s involvement “off the books”, runs the danger of raising the cost of capital and also of performance failure. The Hitachi debacle may be another illustration of the weaknesses and very high capital costs exposed both in the private finance initiative and the blunders associated with the public private partnership for upgrading the London underground [2]. The risks include an impact both on cost – these are all extremely capital intensive projects, and hence on affordability. But, if not delivered, they also imperil the other energy trilemma objectives of security and sustainability.

Third, from a public policy perspective, we are reminded once again that projects that may well be essential to address fundamental concerns such as greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and climate change, will almost always appear as “uneconomic” when there is no means for them to capture the value of full human cost of greenhouse gas emissions. Current carbon prices are nowhere near the level required, either to match the future damage those emissions will cause, or the likely cost of capturing carbon from the atmosphere, something that will almost certainly be required to meet temperature targets such as 1.5^o C. Contrary to some conventional assumptions, an even higher value attaches to reducing current CO2 emissions compared to those in twenty years time. (Again this issue is explored in more detail on another page.)

Fourth, it seems impossible to escape the pernicious consequences of the Brexit traincrash, even though the energy sector might be seen as one of the least affected, at least directly, by question marks over future trade with Europe.  

Fifth and finally, and this is a challenge for my own involvement in the Oxford Martin School programme concerned with renewables, we need to focus more attention on defining, and if possible increasing, the extent to which we can meet future requirements from a combination of intermittent or variable output sources combined with storage and the management of consumer loads. Not least this could help to mitigate the failure to bring forward either carbon capture or nuclear investment in sufficiently timely fashion.

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[1]Energy Systems Catapult is part of a network of world-leading centres set up by the government to transform the UK’s capability for innovation in specific sectors and help drive future economic growth. Its aim is, by taking an independent, whole energy systems view, to work with stakeholders across the energy sector (consumers, industry, academia and government) to identify innovation priorities, gaps in the market and overcome barriers to accelerating the decarbonisation of the energy system at least cost.

Catapult modelling has tended to support both nuclear power, including smaller modular nuclear technology, and carbon capture.

[2] The Blunders of our Governments, Ivor Crewe and Anthony King. 2013. Its treatment of the London underground fiasco, and the very high cost of capital incurred, is particularly scathing.

CARBON FEE AND DIVIDEND. AN IDEA WHOSE TIME IS COMING.

One simple idea unites almost all environmental economists. It is the importance of pricing external costs – the social and environmental damage caused by greenhouse gas emissions – into markets so that users and consumers are forced to recognise and pay for these costs at the point of use, and not allowed to fall instead on the public at large or on future generations.

Unfortunately a simple implementation of such an approach runs head first into some major political realities. The first is that the level of pricing applied to fossil fuels that would be necessary to reduce emissions quickly or substantially is high, and would be a major economic shock both to many industries and consumers. The industries affected tend to be extremely vocal. The second is the observation that any resulting price increases are most likely to have a  disproportionate impact on poorer consumers.

Just to illustrate the point the European Union’s emissions trading scheme (the ETS) has over long periods produced carbon prices of significantly less than €15 per tonne, in a period when the price at which key technology transformations occur has appeared to be much higher, around €70 or more. Even more significantly it is now widely recognised that the world is so far from reaching safe climate targets that it will have to contemplate large scale sequestration of CO2, ie extraction from the atmosphere, with much higher costs, probably at least €200 per tonne (best available current technology puts this figure at around €600 per tonne).

Failures of the ETS reflect many factors, including industry lobbying and the post crisis recession, but they certainly include weak political will in relation to higher carbon prices.

Carbon Fee and Dividend

Citizens’ Climate Lobby[1] has proposed a carbon fee and dividend approach, in which the whole of of the revenue from a “carbon fee” is returned directly to households as a monthly dividend. The idea is that the majority of households will receive more in dividend than they pay in increased energy costs. This feature protects family budgets, frees households to make independent choices about their energy usage. The higher fuel prices spur innovation in low-carbon products.

The scheme would include border adjustments[2] to protect UK businesses, levying import fees on products imported from countries without a price on carbon, along with rebates to UK industries exporting to those countries. This would discourage businesses from relocating where they can emit more CO2 and incentivise other countries to adopt similar carbon pricing policies.

In fact this idea is part of a family of similar ideas aimed at shifting the burden of taxation towards “green taxes” which seek to redress existing market failures that comprehensively fail to address environmental problems. The counter part to these socially beneficial taxes is a reduction in other forms of taxation, and related concepts include “revenue neutral carbon taxation” and the notion of a carbon “wealth fund”, promoted in an earlier blog on this site by Adam Whitmore.

The case for action

I believe there will be numerous points of detail to get right, whatever new approach is adopted, and I have a few concerns on specifics.

·         Border adjustment taxes look fine in principle, but the administrative detail in their application looks formidable, and they would still have to comply with international rules on trade.

·         CCL propose a gradual increase in tax on carbon, starting from quite low numbers. As discussed in another page on this site, the stark message of the science is that the highest cost attaches to early emissions, since they are both cumulative and bring forward climate milestones.

·         Getting both the macroeconomics and the redistributive consequences right will be challenging, both technically and politically.

·         The idea of a wealth fund, as opposed to immediate revenue neutrality, may be the preferable route.

Despite these concerns I am more and more convinced[3] that more effective action on carbon pricing is essential, and that its combination with a redistributive agenda in domestic politics is probably the best available way to break the current logjams on climate policy.

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[1] Citizens’ Climate Lobby (CCL) is a non-profit, nonpartisan, grassroots advocacy organisation, started in the United States. There are now CCL groups in 40 countries, including the UK network established in 2015.

[2] An idea also previously promoted by Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn

[3] https://www.ft.com/content/9a6f8e90-0398-11e9-bf0f-53b8511afd73.  Just a final footnote. 23 December issue – Arun Majumdar in the FT discusses the issue.