|
https://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S1364-0321(21)00381-6
John was system economics lead in Oxford Martin School Integrate programme now morphing into new ZERO Institute. Former Chief Economist, UK Electricity Council, consultant for World Bank, and Chair BIEE climate policy seminars. Short topical posts: HOME AND BLOG page. Click BLOG below photo for recent blogs, or blogs by topic. Navigation bar links to longer individual commentaries, eg SCIENCE VS SCEPTICS, or SITE NAVIGATION. To comment on a post, click on "comments" at end of that post.
|
What Matters Most? Population, GDP Growth or Technology.
A common theme in popular
discussion of climate change, or rather of whether mitigation is feasible, is its
attribution to different factors, notably population growth or economic growth,
and the reliance of solutions on technology. This also affects any discussion
of historic responsibility for CO2 emissions. It is a highly emotive subject,
particularly in relation to population control or the limitation of growth, so
it is at least worth a cursory look at what the hard statistics tell us.
The so-called IPAT equation
represents a general description of human influence on the environment: IMPACT
(of CO2) = [POPULATION] X [AFFLUENCE] X [TECHNOLOGY]. A popular
and useful way of interpreting this for CO2 emissions for the energy
sector is the so-called Kaya Decomposition. Affluence is measured as GDP per
capita and technology is further decomposed as energy per unit of GDP, and CO2 emitted
per unit of energy. The Kaya identity[1] is:
Global Picture. The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014) provided a useful breakdown of changes in global CO2 emissions over several decades, based on this identity:
In the three
decades from 1970 to 2000, population growth and increasing incomes contributed
similar amounts to the rise in emissions, but the energy intensity of GDP fell
quite sharply contributing a significant saving to the level of emissions that
might otherwise have been expected.
The energy
intensity of GDP was a significant offsetting factor, whose importance rose in
1990-2000, possibly reflecting the longer term impact of higher energy prices
and uncertainties in the 1970s and 1980s. However efforts to reduce the carbon
emissions associated with energy use played only a limited role in reducing
emissions. This is unfortunate since reduction of dependence on fossil fuels this is a key component of emissions reduction
hopes, and this factor actually moved in the wrong direction from 2000-2010, again
reflecting in part the Chinese dependence on coal.
From 2000 to
2010 the importance of rising incomes rose relative to population factors,
reflecting inter alia the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. The overall outcome
was particularly depressing as the decade showed a sharp increase in emissions
and lessening impact of the mitigating factors.
Major
regional and temporal differences
But this
decomposition can change significantly over time. Global averages also conceal
major differences between countries, and
there are some optimistic signals. A similar but more recent chart for China (Safonov
reference below) shows overall reductions (to 2016), and significantly more
reductions attributable to less energy intensive GDP and less carbon intensive
energy. For China, population growth has not been a significant factor over
this period, but income growth continues to be so.
Similarly
more optimistic trends have been observed in the USA to 2015, but with higher
influence from population, less from economic growth, and significant
reductions attributable to less energy intensive GDP and less carbon intensive
energy consumption.
An
interesting comparison of country by country decomposition for periods before
and after the financial crash of 2008 is given in a fairly recent paper by
Sadorsky, referenced below. It shows huge diversity in findings between
countries, exemplified in the following chart for four countries:
NB.
This chart has a rather more complex interpretation, as it represents the changes between two very distinct
periods. The reader is referred to the Sadorsky article
Kaya factors.
The future.
Given the
pace of reduction required to reach net zero by 2050, the Kaya emphasis will
have to shift to much greater emphasis on decarbonising energy. Population
cannot be subject to substantial percentage reduction, and the drive for higher
incomes is unlikely to stop. There is some scope for further weakening of the
link between affluence and energy use, but the heavy lifting will depend very
substantially on decarbonisation of energy, starting with the power sector and
expanding the power sector into transport and heating.
References:
IPCC Fifth
Assessment Report.
George Safonov's Lab. National Research University
Higher School of Economics, Moscow. Long-term, Low-emission Pathways in
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of
Korea, Russian Federation, and the United States. December 2018.
Sadorsky, P. Energy
Related CO2 Emissions before and after the Financial Crisis. Sustainability 2020, 12,
3867. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12093867
Dr Ajay
Gambhir, Neil Grant, Dr Alexandre Koberle, Dr Tamaryn Napp. The UK’s
contribution to a Paris-consistent global emissions reduction pathway. Grantham
Institute. Imperial College. 2 May 2019.
Public Utilities
Fortnightly. First Look at 2015 CO2 Emission Trends for the U.S.
For a fuller “actuarial
explanation and justification for the Kaya identity, this reference may help Kaya
identity_JC Final 050219.pdf (actuaries.org.uk)
[1]
Since the identity is multiplicative, a logarithmic transformation is usually
used in the calculation of the factor contributions.
Here are some back of the envelope calculations that demonstrate the credibility of the assertion that action to mitigate climate change, and progress to a low carbon economy, can be achieved at a containable cost. It aims to provide a simple intuitive defence of conventional estimates for the general reader, but serious students of the subject are invited to delve deeper into some of the excellent material produced under the aegis of the Committee on Climate Change[1].
One of the arguments mounted
against taking effective action on climate is that the economic cost is
unaffordable. The obvious response is that this has to be compared with the
cost of not taking action, the costs of adaptation, and the possibility of
existential climate threats on an unimaginable scale. However rather than
engage with the occasionally hysterical accusations of alarmism from those in
denial on the climate science, it is worth trying to get a sense of the scale
of what may be involved in meeting a UK zero carbon target by 2050. Some sense
of proportion should start to defuse the issue and calm any fears of national
bankruptcy.[2]
This can be a confusing
exercise, not least because estimates (of mitigation costs) tend to get tossed
around in very different contexts. For example, it’s most common for costs to
be discussed in very broad terms as a percentage of GDP. The Stern Review
indicated costs of up to 2.0 % of GDP per annum, and some people have argued
that this would be a very damaging and unsustainable burden in macro-economic
terms. The Committee on Climate Change
currently makes a similar estimate (of 1-2 % of GDP). Others argue that Green
investment can actually be used to boost economic growth and domestic
employment[3]. There can be at least a
partial truth in this argument, even if it can be misrepresented as arguing
that the low carbon economy pays for itself. It is not an argument I intend to
deploy here.
Some will be more concerned
with the public expenditure implications, although that issue should be seen
much more in terms of more political questions of how we choose to fund
transformational change. For example, much of the cost of transition to low
carbon may be carried by private consumers, in their utility bills or more
expensive motoring choices, or it may include publicly funded infrastructure
investment and extensive grants and subsidies.
Macro-economic shocks and UK GDP
numbers
2019 GDP (last year before
pandemic) £ 2170 billion pa
Estimated permanent loss of
GDP due to 2008 financial crisis £
300 billion pa
The economy is 16%, or £300 billion, smaller than it would have
been had it followed the pre-crisis trend. (IFS 2018[4])
Typical impact of an oil price
shock[5] in 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. £ 100 billion pa
(an order of magnitude estimate, based on spikes and falls in
the oil price of $100/ bbl, UK consumption of 100 mn tonnes pa,
and scaling up to an equivalent percentage of 2019 GDP)
I have not included the significantly
larger shifts in resources associated with different government priorities on
taxation and spending. Even so, the conclusion we might draw here is that the
expenditure on a low carbon economy, while substantial, is far from
catastrophic and unmanageable when viewed in macro-economic terms. We have
coped with much larger and less predictable economic shocks than what we now
face in eliminating emissions.
Public expenditure choices
Expenditure budget 2021: £
908 bn.
Defence £ 54 bn pa
Defence in 1951 (Korean War) accounted
for
10% of GDP. Equivalent percentage of 2019 GDP £
217 bn pa
Overseas aid (0.7% of GDP
target) £ 15 bn pa
Overseas aid (after current
cuts) £ 10.85 bn pa
Reported cost of UK Track and
Trace system[6] £ 37 bn
(spread over two years but seems to be essentially
a 12 month figure). Minimal identified benefit.
Assumption of a 2% of 2019 GDP
devoted to GHG £
43 bn pa
reduction and low carbon transition. (as above)
But what can you buy for 2% of
GDP?
It turns out you can do quite
a lot for decarbonisation with around £ 40 billion a year. Here is one
allocation of that money:
Decarbonising the power
sector. £
18 bn pa
Retrofitting UK housing stock.
28 million households £
20 bn pa
Grant of £ 20,000 per household for retrofitting, at one million
households a year for 28 years
Charging infrastructure for
electric vehicles (EVs) £
2.5 bn pa
Total £
40.5 bn pa
This covers the three main
sources of UK emissions, and the main areas for investment to achieve net zero
by 2050. Assumptions to justify the plausibility of these numbers are as
follows
Power Sector
Sizewell C has an estimated
capital cost of around £ 18 billion for 3.2 GW of capacity. Nuclear is
currently regarded as one of the more expensive options for low carbon
capacity, and Sizewell is “first of a kind” but this at least gives us an order
of magnitude. The equivalent of one Sizewell a year for 25 years delivers
around 80 GW of capacity and more than 600 TWh pa of energy, more than enough, even
after allowing for significant growth, to effectively decarbonise a power
sector which already has a significant proportion of renewable low carbon
energy. [Current UK annual consumption less than 350 TWh]
Alternative renewable sources
are also widely seen as likely to be much cheaper than this, although there
will be other major costs associated with energy storage. However we might
interpret this as at least a first approximation, or an upper limit to the
capital cost for low carbon generation. A great deal of new investment would of
course be required in any case, so much of this will not be a truly incremental
cost.
Heating of buildings
Retro-fitting of buildings,
especially residential property, for energy efficiency and low carbon heat
pumps or heat network solutions, is one of the biggest problems for achieving
zero carbon. The cost of air or ground source heat pump installations are
currently advertised at around £ 6000-8000 and up to £ 16000 respectively,
while heat networks are collective typically municipal investments which can
also be quite costly. But even adding on a substantial allowance for insulation
improvement, £ 20000 per household would look like an extremely generous grant
to a householder, especially as there would be a continuing benefit in lower
running costs.
Electric vehicles
“The UK by 2040 needs 1-2.5
million new charging points. An average public charging point costs 25-30,000
euros so it would need to invest 33-87bn euros from now until 2040,” said Wood
Mackenzie’s Wetzel. Interpreting this as two million over twenty years and assuming
a cost per installation of £ 25000, this implies an annual investment of £ 2.5
billion.
The price of EVs is likely to
fall dramatically with increasing scale, so we should not need to worry unduly
about the capital costs of fleet replacement, which will be borne by motorists
as they retire their existing vehicles.
Conclusions
Current estimates of
expenditure required for a zero-carbon economy are plausible. In no sense can
they be considered unattainable or damaging in macro-economic terms, as the
sums are smaller and more predictable than the much bigger economic shocks we
have endured in recent decades from other sources. Viewed as public expenditure
choices the sums are commensurate with other choices we make and have made,
such as the unfortunate “test and trace” scheme. An it is quite easy to
hypothesise major elements in the composition of that expenditure.
Caveat. Sharp-eyed
readers will have noticed that I have omitted some of the notoriously
difficult, but smaller, sectors, such as aviation and shipping. But I believe
the biggest additional issue will be the funds that high income countries will
need to find in order to support low carbon strategies in the developing
world. That is a different story, and
one that I have addressed in earlier posts this year.
[2]
This post concentrates on UK statistics but the same arguments, and similar
orders of magnitude, will apply to most developed economies.
[3]
Retrofitting the UK housing stock, and many other infrastructure investments,
will be labour intensive.
[4] 10 years on - have we
recovered from the financial crisis? - Institute For Fiscal Studies - IFS.
Paul Johnson and Jonathan Cribb. 2018
[5]
The UK became a net oil exporter during this period, so the macro-economic
consequences for the UK relate both to price shocks and significant changes in
production.
[6] “Chancellor
Rishi Sunak’s Budget last week included an additional £15bn for test and trace,
taking the total bill to more than £37bn over two years.” [Independent. 10
March 2021]
This is the substance of a recent talk I was asked to give at a recent COP26 roundtable in Turkmenistan. It is an attempt to summarise, for policy makers, some of the general principles we have learned in the course of the Oxford Martin School Integrate project.
…………………………………………………………………….
First, the context. A low
carbon power sector has a central role in reducing CO2 emissions and making
progress towards zero carbon. This is not just because fossil-based power has
high emissions and we already have numerous technologies for low carbon
generation. A low or zero carbon power sector means we can progressively use
electricity solutions to reduce CO2 emissions in other major categories,
notably transport and heat.
The task then is developing and
integrating renewable and other low carbon energy resources into power systems
that deliver what we need and expect. The main factors that have to be
respected and reconciled are the following:
·
Power systems require flexible responses to balance real
time supply and demand.
·
Low carbon sources (mostly) lack the flexibility of
traditional thermal generation plant using coal oil or gas.
·
Renewables output can be intermittent and unpredictable
Today I am going to summarise some of
the general principles we have learned in the Oxford Martin School. The principles
apply not just to the UK but in virtually all power systems. However, lesson
one is that every country and every network is different, in terms of its
available resources, its climate, weather and seasonal effects, and the needs
of its consumers. So the best choices for the future will also be different.
Framing the Policy Choices
We have used this diagram to represent
the task, and the large number of questions that need to be addressed. The
potential resources and activities that we can manage, the options available to
the power sector, are shown in the top row - generation, storage, networks and
consumption. Costs are generally coming down.
The policy instruments that we have to
manage these options can be categorised, in the left-hand column, in terms of
technology and innovation, the wise use of markets and price signals, social
engagement in the process of change, and finally the whole framework of law,
organisation, policy, regulation and governance on which the sector depends.
There are 16 cells in this 4x4 matrix,
and there will be important questions in almost all of them.
Starting
with the resources, choices involve selection from a long menu, much of which I
am showing on this slide. Virtually all the items here feature in the UK as
part of our likely solutions, and they are all potentially important. I will
just comment on a few highlights.
·
When we look ahead to planning the power sector, we have to
look not only at the current use and applications of electricity but also at
its substitution for other fuels in new applications, especially transport and
the provision of heat. This implies coordination across sectors.
·
Electric vehicles especially have the potential to play a
huge part in the operations of the power sector.
·
Interconnection. The recent power crisis in Texas has
highlighted the importance of interconnection and the risk of isolation.
·
Solving the storage problem is one of the most challenging
parts of the exercise, at least from a technical and economic perspective.
·
Consumers are also a vital part of the system, technically,
economically, and politically. They merit a separate conference on their own.
Technical
and technology choices
The
choices have to be complementary rather than exclusive. This will involve
substantial computer modelling of alternative combinations to find out what
works best.
So the
balance, getting the right mixture, of solar, wind, biomass and other
sources is essential. For the UK, for example, meeting seasonal variations is
very important, implying a higher ratio of wind to solar.
Storage
is going to be important everywhere. Battery technology and pumped hydro, possibly
some interconnection, combined with the ability to make use of more
time-flexibility in consumer demands, will mostly be more than adequate for
smoothing daily variations. But inter-seasonal storage is potentially a much
bigger problem, unless the capital cost per unit of energy stored can be
greatly reduced. The most promising answer appears to be conversion of renewables
output into high energy forms which can be stored more cheaply. Hydrogen may be
the preferred long term storage option at the present time, but there are other
contenders.
In the
UK, a bigger issue than seasonal storage may turn out to be risk of prolonged
periods of low wind. Some modelling has simulated the effects using weather
data over the last 40 years, and this has proved a useful exercise.
Markets
and prices
These
issues have related to technical planning, and available innovations, but there
are also major implications for markets, governance, and the management and
control of the sector. Turkmenistan and the UK have very different starting
positions. Turkmenistan starts from a position of government ownership and
control of the power sector, and supply to many consumers has been free. The UK
has private ownership and some market structures but also has increasing
government involvement in underwriting new low carbon investments, and in
ensuring coordination within the sector. Despite these differences, I believe
that there are some important common principles.
One is
how to choose the most efficient plant to operate. In the UK we call this the
merit order. As we progress towards low carbon economies, this will normally imply
the plant with lowest CO2 emissions per kWh. In the UK and Europe this means
that a price has to be attached to emissions and that must impact on the
economic choices made for the sector. But it is also true that the task of
managing power systems effectively with high renewables presents new
challenges. In the UK we are also having to re-examine the methods that we use
to get the most efficient operation of the system. The optimisation methods designed
for a world of coal and gas generation are not necessarily the right ones for a
low carbon system.
Consumer
tariffs are very important. They are central to the ecology of the power sector
as the primary means of communication between production and consumption. The
priority attaching to reduced emissions is such that this should be reflected
in cost reflective pricing. Tariffs are even more important if we need to
promote more flexible demand. We expect to see some profound changes in the nature
of the services provided by electric power in meeting consumer needs.
Finance
and Governance
My last
big economic issue is financing. It is widely held that collectively the world
has a glut of savings waiting to be invested in useful projects. Also, the cost
of capital is at historically low levels. But to access that capital, for any country
or industry dependent on external or private finance, it will be essential to
demonstrate that the investment is going to be well managed. The institutional
structure is important for that and also for successful implementation.
This
means ensuring a good and stable legal and institutional framework within which
low carbon investments can be delivered, and one that banks, the World Bank and
others, or other investors, can rely on. That of course depends on the
commitment of governments, in the UK as much as anywhere, to low carbon
objectives.
Viewed as independent countries California and Texas would both rank among the ten largest economies in the world. One Democrat and the other Republican, the feature they now have in common is failure to prevent extensive and disruptive interruptions to power supply – California in 2001 and Texas in February 2021. In both states near-catastrophic failures raise questions as to the viability of highly market-driven power systems, which contrast with the stability of more integrated models of the East Coast of the US, and internationally. The answers matter, not just for Texas, but for developed and developing economies everywhere.
In California, the new market
structures had only recently been introduced. California had copied many features of
the UK 1990 model, which had worked successfully, or at least without major
mishap, for ten years. With the benefit of hindsight and a lot of analysis, there
seems to be a reasonable consensus that the failures resulted from a
combination of factors:
·
Weaknesses in the design of the new market
structures
·
State regulatory authorities’ imposition of a
price cap, which prevented the market working as it should, to reduce demand
and increase supply.
·
Market abuse by Enron, notoriously exploiting
the rules to gain large economic rents. Enron went on to become a major
corporate scandal, but California was the setting for some of its most
egregious wrongdoings.
The recent failures in Texas,
celebrated as an example of liberalised market reform, are harder to explain.
Unusual weather conditions may be a proximate cause but are hardly an adequate
excuse for one of the wealthiest advanced economies in the world, in a
liberalised power sector that has appeared to operate without serious mishap
since the late 1990s. The other factor cited, the intermittency of wind, can be
dismissed as a credible explanation; if relevant at all, it is a known risk
that should have been easily managed in a well-functioning sector. We need to
look further for adequate explanations of failure to provide reserve capacity.
Creating incentives for
private operators to provide the level of reliability that the public want has
always been a potential weakness of market-driven systems, usually resolved by
the imposition of reserve margins, and financial incentives or penalties. Peter
Cramton[1] is Vice-Chair of ERCOT, the body that has
coordinated the Texas power sector over this period, and has described[2] the approach taken to this
problem in Texas. It is an administered scarcity price similar to that used in
the 1990 UK reforms, which operated successfully up to the introduction of
further changes in 2000.
A market in reliability
The Texas model,
according to Cramton, sets out the rules to determine an administered
scarcity price, in periods when there may be very high or peak demand or
low supply. In theory this should incentivise
sufficient capacity (Q) at all times. The administered price aims to
reflect the value of lost load (VOLL), and a high VOLL should in consequence
result in high reserve margins for generating capacity. Texas sets a high value
for VOLL. [3]
Simple economics suggests high rewards will bring forward more than adequate
supply.
One possible explanation for the
current failure is simply that this scheme lacks credibility. If we look at these
incentives for investors in potential reserve capacity, then the return on
investment – the future revenue stream – may depend on achieving ultra-high
prices in periods with an ultra-low probability of occurrence. This probabilistic
estimate may indicate good “expected value” returns, but the very high chance
of zero revenue is not attractive as a basis for large scale investments. Paradoxically
the higher the value of VOLL, the rarer the occurrence of periods of scarcity
and the less credible the projected revenue becomes.
Closely linked is the matter
of regulatory credibility: if prices need to go that high, as they must do to
validate the investment in reserve capacity, and particularly if the price
spikes impact on consumers, will the regulatory or political authorities really
stand aside and let them happen? The 2001 California experience, at least as
suggested in many accounts of that event, suggests otherwise.
What do UK market models tell
us?
The UK used its own version of
an administered scarcity price from 1990 up to 2000. Fortunately, this was a
period with a legacy of surplus capacity, so the method was not subject to
severe stress tests. It worked well but was also criticised for potentially
allowing larger generators to exploit their market power. It was replaced in
2000 by trading arrangements which had no formal mechanism for capacity. It
rapidly became apparent, however, that these would not incentivise new
capacity, and would pose an increasing risk to reliability of supply. The UK
moved gradually towards the establishment of capacity markets to supplement the
new arrangements.
In practice this means that
investment in new capacity does not depend on investors responding to market
price signals and guessing future prices in the “energy only” electricity
market. Virtually all new UK generating
capacity results either from government choices, long term contracts (nuclear
plant), from feed in tariffs, or from capacity auctions.
If fixing prices (P) doesn’t
work, try fixing quantities (Q)? P or Q?
Economists will be familiar
with markets where the choice is to use price or quantity as the appropriate
instrument of policy. A good illustration is the energy policy choice between a
carbon tax (P) and setting emissions quotas (Q) which can traded. It is
possible for the price and quantity outcomes to be the same under either regime,
but the choice is important and is usually made on an empirical or
pragmatic basis, of what is likely to work best or be more politically and
socially acceptable. The UK approach, de facto, for reliability, is to
concentrate on fixing Q.
In this context, capacity
markets can fix Q if a central authority – government, regulator or utility –
decides on the reserve margin and the reliability standard, and invites tenders
to provide that capacity. This has the advantage of much more certainty that
the reserve will be provided, but it places the onus on the central authority,
not just to decide how much capacity but also, in practice, to determine the
right technology mix, and to monitor delivery. It represents the abandonment of
most of the tenets of a market fundamentalist approach to the power sector.
Regulation and Governance for
the Power Sector
It is always tempting to read
too much into a single event, when there will inevitably be multiple
interpretations of what has happened, and rarely one simple explanation.
Another focus will no doubt be on the general governance and regulatory arrangements
in Texas, and the role of ERCOT (see below). However, the “standard model” of
unbundled utilities, wholesale and retail competition, independent regulation and
excessive reliance on markets, however flawed, must come under more scrutiny. Pioneered
in the UK, promoted by the World Bank, the European Commission and others, it
looks increasingly incapable of responding to today’s policy challenges, of
which the climate emergency is just one.
[1]
Cramton is an academic economist, who has described and indeed promoted
market-driven models for the power sector. He described the role of ERCOT and
the power sector in Texas in a paper - Electricity Market Design - in the
Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
[2] Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, Volume 33, Issue 4, Winter 2017, Pages 589–612
[3] In
Texas VOLL was set administratively at $9,000/MWh—367 times higher than the
average energy price of $24.62/MWh in 2016.
.........................................
Additional Notes.
A regulatory issue. There
is another feature of the power sector in Texas which is at odds with the
“standard model” of liberalised markets and independent regulation. The Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) effectively controls the functioning,
in operational terms, of the Texas power system. It is an umbrella
organisation, whose membership includes the utilities, generators and other
stakeholders in the sector. It implicitly assumes responsibility for
reliability and by its nature provides scope for formal or informal
coordination within the sector. This might be interpreted as a quasi-regulatory
role, violating one of the conventional principles of sound regulation, namely that
the regulator should be independent of ownership and management. There is an additional oversight from a Texas
Public Utilities Commission, but it is unlikely this will have had the
knowledge or expertise to probe ERCOT too closely, especially on technical
issues
It is possible to argue that ERCOT
also provides a vehicle for informal planning or informal guarantees for future
investment, and that coordination and more rigorous planning disciplines, plus technical
monitoring of capacity, should have been applied. I would argue in this instance that it was
reliance on a “market” mechanism that is the more likely prime cause of the
failure.
…………………………………
California. See for example
Weare, Christopher (2003) The
California Electricity Crisis: Causes and Policy Options ISBN 1-58213-064-7;
………………………………
There is another important alternative
to administered scarcity prices. It is to allow scarcity prices to be set in a
market by consumer choices and consumer valuation of reliability, but that is
generally seen as currently impractical, because consumers lack the technical capability
to respond quickly to price or crisis signals. However increasing digitalisation,
and concepts like differential reliability and supplier managed loads- see my
tariffs paper - will take us in that direction in the future.
A recent FT article argued the importance of electric vehicles in Africa, as an essential component of a global strategy to limit emissions and combat climate change. A predictable response from readers was that this was wholly impractical on the grounds of both affordability and the current inadequacy of African power systems. Healthy scepticism is fine but it should not obscure the fact that it is in an African and global interest to leapfrog to an electricity based transport technology. Electric vehicles can be part of the solution for Africa’s power systems, not just another problem.
Vome Aghoghovbia-Gafaar writes[1]
on “Why Sub-Saharan Africa’s teeming cities need electric vehicles.” The
response from FT readers was sceptical, making the seemingly obvious points
that Africans will not be able to afford expensive Teslas, that even developed
countries are struggling with the infrastructure electric vehicles (EVs)
require, that Africa largely lacks adequate power supplies, and that better
mass transit systems are perhaps a more immediate transport priority for Africa’s
mega-cities like Lagos or Dar-es-Salaam.
Healthy scepticism is fine,
but there is a wider case for EVs in Africa, and it builds on the almost
universal imperative to move rapidly towards low carbon sources of electricity
as a substitute for fossil fuel use. The big issues for this target in Africa
are first the absence of affordable electricity, and second the unsustainability
of clean economic development without it.
The global imperative is that
unless we can achieve a transformation of the power sector in Africa, which
enables both economic development and a switch to low carbon fuel sources, then
the chances of meeting global emissions and climate targets are very low indeed.
That reality should condition our judgements on the realism of prospects for
overcoming the undoubted obstacles
From my experience the
biggest single barrier to resolve the first issue – affordability – is likely
to be the very high component of fixed cost, which especially in poor
communities has to be spread over a small number of kWh. The only way to get
the unit cost down is by much higher volumes, but these are often hard to
achieve.
Africa has some of the
highest unit costs and prices for power in the world, as well as many of the poorest
people. This combination makes it particularly difficult to build the volumes,
and the economies of scale, which are ultimately the only ways of bringing
these costs down.
For rural electrification, involving some of the poorest communities, the World Bank has estimated kWh costs could be brought down to about 22c per kWh with the achievement of reasonable load volumes and a 40% load factor. Neither of these conditions is easily met, however. Moreover much of Africa is well endowed with solar power, but the management, even of small systems with intermittent energy, is problematic in the absence of storage or back-up. And similar issues can be expected in urban systems.
Electric vehicles help with
both problems. It is intrinsically a large load, and with a high percentage of
EV batteries connected to the grid when the vehicle is not in use, eg in the
evening, this creates significant opportunities to improve load factor,
substantially reducing the unit costs to other productive uses of electricity,
and to cooking. The latter in particular offers a big environmental benefit. Electricity can substitute for firewood or charcoal, whose continued use has
disastrous consequences for deforestation as well as a large carbon
footprint. The scale of emissions from these unsustainable sources is comparable to that of diesel used as a transport fuel.
As an idealised solution,
therefore, promotion of electric vehicles in Africa can provide a classic
synergy in terms of reducing emissions, providing clean energy and assisting economic
development. In itself it reduces harmful emissions, a global CO2
benefit, as well as localised city pollution. The key to the economics is that if
the vehicles and their batteries are already there, some of the essential but
very expensive storage requirement of renewable power systems is already in
place.
The additional load permits
more effective management of renewable systems and much higher load factors. Both
these gains would have a big impact in reducing unit costs, and this in itself
could create a virtuous circle of more affordable power, more productive use of
that power, higher incomes and improved affordability, feeding back into further
economies of scale, cheaper power, and less polluted cities.
Measuring the benefits
In an earlier
post[2],
I discussed the benefits of eliminating traditional and unsustainable use of
firewood or charcoal for domestic cooking. The potential reduction in CO2 emissions
is huge. Charcoal use is widespread in the developing world and its elimination
for a billion people (a conservative estimate of potential) could reduce global
emissions by as much as 700 million tonnes or about 3 % of the total. The
nature of the emissions externality is that the benefit accrues to the global
community as a whole, not just to Africa. But the scale, with any reasonable
valuation of carbon, is huge
The contribution from
eliminating oil dependent road transport in Africa could be of a similar order
of magnitude, with a similar global benefit.
How realistic is all this?
As electric vehicles take an
increasing market share, some of the barriers are likely to fade away. Scale
economies will bring down manufacturing costs and prices to consumers, along
with a new generation of vehicles made in China or India, probably with more
basic specifications but significantly lower costs. Electric vehicles combined
with electric cooking could, as suggested above, mitigate the technical and economic
problems in developing the power sector
The biggest barrier remains the
quantum leap required of African power sectors, partly in terms of governance
but even more in terms of the sheer amount of capital required. Help from
development aid budgets will be a necessity. But, as I have suggested above,
failure in this task should not be considered an option. The global economic cost
of climate catastrophe, or the cost of expensive carbon extraction from the atmosphere
(which we shall almost certainly be forced to adopt) could make African electrification
a bargain form of carbon reduction for wealthier nations.
…………..
References
Energy
and Transport in Africa and South Asia. Katherine A. Collett, Maximus
Byamukama, Constance Crozier, Malcolm McCulloch February 2020